Jury Verdict as a Function of The Defendant's Prior Record And Apparent Guilt by Bedrick, Dianna Marie
.TURY VERDICT AS A FUNCTION OF THE 
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR RECORD 
AND APPARENT GUILT 
By 
DIANNA MARIE BEDRICK 
' 
Bachelor of Arts 
North Texas State University 
Denton, Texas 
1973 
Submitted to the Faculty of the 
Graduate College of the 
Oklahoma State University 
in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for 
the Degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
May, 1980 
JURY VERDICT AS A FUNCTION OF THE 
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR RECORD 
AND APPARENT GUILT 
Thesis Approveds 
De~nof Graduate College 
105/1772 
ii 
PREFACE 
This study is concerned primarily with the effect of 
knowledge of a defendant's prior criminal record on jury 
verdict behavior and deliberation time. The effect of 
presence of prior record is investigated across three levels 
of evidence, ranging from h,igh to low apparent guilt. In 
addition. the jurors' manner of information integration is 
explored, using their responses on several rating tasks. 
The author wishes to express her appreciation to her 
major adviser, Dr. Bill Scott, for his assistance and guid-
ance throughout this research effort. Appreciation is also 
expressed to the other members of the committee, Dr. Bob Helm 
and Dr. William Rambo, for their invaluable assistance in the 
preparation of the final manuscript. 
A note of thanks is extended to Judge Ray Lee Wall of 
the Ninth Judicial District, State of Oklahoma, for his 
invaluable assistance in providing necessary legal informa• 
tion and facilities in the planning and preparation stages of 
the research, and to Dr. James Price for his assistance in 
preparing the computer program used to analyze these data. 
Finally, special gratitude is expressed to my parents, 
Mr. and Mrs. Rudolph J. Bedrick, for their understanding, 
support, and many sacrifices. 
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter 
I. 
II. 
III. 
IV. 
INTRODUCTION • • • • • • 
Rationale for the Present Study 
Review of the Literature •• 
Overview of the Present Study 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • 
. .  • • 
METHOD • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Subjects • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Experimental Design • • • • • • • • • • 
Materials • • • • • • • • • • 
Stimulus Materials • • • • • • • • 
Materials Used During Deliberations • 
Post-Deliberation Materials • • • • 
Procedure • • • • • • • • • • • • 
RESULTS • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Jury Processes • • • • • • • • • • 
Verdict • • • • • • • • • • • 
Deliberation Time and Sentencing 
Juror Behavior • • • • • • • • • • • 
Verdict • • • • • • • • • 
Verdict Change • • • • • • • 
Recall of Evidence • • • • • • 
Semantic Differential • • • • 
Evidence Importance Ratings • • 
Alternates • • • • • • . • • • • • • 
DISCUSSION • • • • • • • • • 0 • • • 
The Juries • • • • • • • • • 
Introduction • • • • • • • • • 
Verdict • • • • • • • • 
Deliberation Time for Verdict • 
The Jurors • • • • • • • • • 
Semantic Differential Ratings • 
Evidence Importance Ratings • • 
The Alternates • • • ••••• 
Conclusion • • • • • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • 
• 
• • • 
REFERENCE NOTES • • • • • • • • • • • • 
iv 
Page 
1 
l 
5 
8 
11 
12 
12 
13 
13 
15 
15 
17 
20 
21 
21 
24 
27 
27 
Jl 
Jl 
32 
37 
50 
53 
53 
53 
54 
58 
61 
61 
63 
70 
71 
74 
Chapter 
REFERENCES • • • • • I e e e • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
APPENDIXES • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
APPENDIX A - TRIAL SCRIPT: AMBIGUOUS EVIDENCE 
CONDITION , , • • • • • • • • • • • • 
APPENDIX B - PRIOR CRIMINAL RECORD JUDGMENT 
CERTIFICATE • • • • • • • • • • • 
APPENDIX C - VERDICT AND SENTENCING FORMS • • • 
• • 
• • 
Page 
75 
78 
78 
101 
102 
APPENDIX D - SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL • • • • • • • • 103 
APPENDIX E - EVIDENCE RECALL QUESTIONNAIRE • • • • 105 
107 APPENDIX F - EVIDENCE IMPORTANCE QUESTIONNAIRE • • 
APPENDIX G - EVIDENCE IMPORTANCE ITEMS • • • • • • 108 
APPENDIX H - ORIENTATION INFORMATION 
APPENDIX I - QUESTIONS FOR VOIR DIRE 
• • • • • • • 109 
• • • • • • • 
APPENDIX J - FURTHER INFORMATION FOR JURORS • • • • 
APPENDIX K - GROUP RESULTS • • • • • • • • • • • • 
APPENDIX L - DATA FOR ALTERNATES • • • • • • • • • 
v 
111 
112 
114 
116 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table Page 
I. Jury Verdicts •••••••••••••••••• 2J 
II. Means for·Group Data •••• , •••••••••• 23 
III. Deliberation Time for Verdict • • • • • • • • • • 25 
IV, Guilty Verdict Groups • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 26 
v. Means for Individual Data • • • • • • • • • • • • 28 
VI. Correlations for Individual Subjects • • • • • •• 29 
VII. Semantic Differentials Potency • • • • • • • •• 33 
VIII. 
IX. 
x. 
XI. 
XII. 
XIII. 
XIV, 
xv. 
Semantic Differentials 
Semantic Differentials 
Activity • 
Evaluation 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • • • 35 
• • • • • 35 
Overall Mean Importance Ratings for 
Items of Evidence • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 38 
Amount of Money Found on Defendant 
When Arrested • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 41 
Bartender's Testimony • • • • • • • • • 
Claim by Victim that He Saw Defendant's 
Face During Attack •••••••••• 
Defendant's Lack of Corroboration • • • 
Absence of Stains on Defendant's Clothes 
When Arrested • • • • • • • • • , • • 
vi 
• • • • • 43 
• • • • • 
45 
• • • • 
• 47 
• • • • • 
49 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Rationale for the Present Study 
The operation of the .iury system in this country is 
considered primarily as a legal process by most people. In 
recent years, however, social psychologists have become 
increasingly interested in the individual and social pro-
cesses which occur in the courtroom and the deliberation 
chamber. 
The word ".iury" is defined as a "body of laymen sel-
ected by lot, or by some other fair and impartial means, to 
ascertain, under the guidance of a judge, the truth in ques-
tions of fact arising either.in a civil or criminal proceed-
ing" (Gulick & Kimbrough, 1965, p. 626). When a person has 
been charged with a crime, he is guaranteed certain rights, 
among them the right to a trial by an impartial jury and the 
right against self-incrimination. In order to prevent the 
jury's receiving biasing information, federal rules of evi-
dence state that a prosecutor cannot use information about a 
defendant's "bad character" as evidence in the trial--the 
trial evidence must be limited to actual occurrences which 
bear directly on the facts of the criminal act before the 
court (Brooks & Doob, 1975). 
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In cases where the crime of which the defendant is 
accused constitutes a second or subsequent felony offense, 
or in cases where the death penalty is a possibility, the 
trial is to be "bifurcated," consisting of two stages. 
During the first stage of a bifurcated trial procedure, 
evidence regarding the crime itself is presented. After 
this initial stage, the jury decides the guilt or innocence 
of the defendant. If they find the defendant not guilty, 
the trial is over; if, however, the jury returns a verdict 
of guilty, information regarding the defendant's prior crim-
inal record (previous convictions of felonies and crimes of 
"moral turpitude") is introduced during the second stage. 
The bifurcated trial enables the jury to consider the defen-
dant's prior record in recommending punishment. In this 
manner, "habitual offenders" can be dealt with more harshly 
(Oklahoma Statutes 1971, and 1977 Amendment, Title 22, 
Section 860). Further, during this stage of the proceeding, 
attorneys can introduce evid·ence of a mitigating or aggra-
vating nature in order to influence the setting of punish-
ment (Note 1). Thus, the rules of evidence for the two 
stages are substantially different. The Supreme Court has 
noted that making a distinction between the evidenciary 
rules governing trial and those governing sentencing is 
sound (Fellman, 1958, Chap. 4): 
The trial is.limited narrowly to strictly relevant 
evidence, to avoid waste of time and confusion, and 
to prevent influencing the court by evidence of 
other misconduct. But a sentencing judge is not 
limited to the issue of guilt, his task being to 
decide upon a type of punishment within the statu-
tory limits. It is both relevant and essential for 
the judge to have in his possession the fullest 
possible information (Fellman, 1958, p. 45). 
In Oklahoma the jury recommends sentence. The court 
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is bound by law to follow the jury's recommendation except 
when the jury cannot reach unanimous agreement or when the 
punishment decided upon is excessive (greater than the maxi-
mum fixed by law). When the exceptions occur, the judge 
sets sentences (Oklahoma Statutes 1971, Title 22, Sections 
926-928). In addition, the judge may rule suspension or 
probation of all or any part of the sentence (Oklahoma 
Statutes 1971, Title 22, Section 991). 
The major problem that a defendant encounters during a 
bifurcated trial becomes apparent when he has a prior crimi-
nal record and his defense demands that he testify in his 
own behalf. When the defendant takes the witness stand, the 
prosecutor can, in cross-examination during the first stage 
of the bifurcated trial, question the defendant regarding 
his prior criminal record for the purpose of affecting his 
credibility as a witness (Oklahoma Statutes 1971, and 1977 
Amendment, Title 22, Section 860). Questions about the 
prior record of the defendant can also be introduced in order 
to establish identification of the defendant (Note 2). 
This situation places the defendant in a serious 
dilemma. The reason for providing the bifurcated procedure 
is to prevent jury exposure to legally irrelevant informa-
tion, which expressly includes the defendant's past record. 
Yet, if the defendant takes the stand, he cannot refuse to 
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answer questions about his prior criminal record. If he 
does not take the stand, the jury will most likely be biased 
against him since it is likely to reason that if he were 
innocent he would assert h.is innocence under oath (Fellman, 
1958, Chap. 9). 
In addition, the jury empaneled for a bifurcated trial 
is not supposed to know that their trial is a bifurcated 
procedure because they may thereby suspect that a past 
criminal record is involved. Any citizen who has served on 
a jury previously, however, is likely to be aware of trial 
bifurcation, and nothing prevents his sharing this infor-
mation with other jurors (Note 1). Because of this problem, 
some legal practitioners believe that all trials should be 
bifurcated (Notes 1 & 2). 
In summary, the legal rationale for providing the 
bifurcated trial is that information about the defendant's 
prior criminal record is irrelevant during the verdict 
phase, but is necessary during sentencing. Knowledge of a 
defendant's past is thought to unduly influence the verdict 
behavior of the jury, thereby preventing the jury from being 
wholly objective in their consideration of the trial evidence. 
The purpose of the present study is to examine the 
effects of knowledge of a defendant's prior record upon the 
verdict behavior of jury groups. This variable will be 
investigated across three levels of evidence, ranging from 
high to low apparent guilt. 
Review of the Literature 
Psychological research in jury processes has been 
hampered by methodological problems and by pragmatic 
., 
difficulties involving the secrecy which characterizes jury 
behavior in the legal system. The most common research 
designs used in jury research consist of variations on two 
basic methodologies. When the experimenter is interested in 
decisions and attributes of individual jurors, subjects are 
usually exposed to a scenario (either of a crime or the 
trial evidence relating to a crim.e), and then they express 
opinions as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, and 
assign punishment. The attributes of interest in the study 
are usually measured with one or more instruments. The 
second res·eareh method is used when the jury as a group is 
of primary interest. In this paradigm, subjects are assigned 
to juries, presented with an account of a crime or with trial 
evidence, and then are observed during the jury deliberation. 
Numerous aspects of individual juror behavior have been 
investigated. Authoritarianism appears to be the attribute 
which has been investigated the most. Studies in this area 
have found, for example, that authoritarians seem to be more 
severe, both in conviction and sentencing, to low-status 
defendants (Roberts & Jessor, 1958) and to attitudinally-
dissimilar defendants (Byrne, 1965). Other studies have found 
that authoritarians are more likely than egalitarians to err 
in the direction of a guilty verdict; that anti-authoritarians 
are more likely to err in the direction of a verdict of not 
guilty (Boehm, 1968); and that authoritarians are more 
likely to recall evidence regarding the character of the 
defendant, whereas egalitarians recall more evidence about 
the crime itself (Berg & Vidmar, 1975). 
Other factors which influence the decision-making pro-
cesses of individual jurors are topics such as locus of 
control (Phares & Wilson, 1972; Sosis, 1974), belief in a 
just world (Jones & Aronson, 1973), and racism (Bullock, 
1971: Green, 1964; Nemeth & Sosis, 1973). Sue, Smith, and 
Caldwell (1973) found that certainty of guilt was positively 
related to severity of punishment assigned. 
Research investigating the jury as a group has studied 
decision processes and size of the jury. In studying the 
group processes of juries, Foss (1976) concluded that simu-
lated juries reach a final decision by an egalitarian pro-
cess in which individual points of view are fairly represented. 
Foss suggested that the various extralegal factors which have 
been identified as influencing decision-making in individual 
jurors may be less important for group judgments than might 
be assumed from studies of individual jurors. This conclu-
sion gains support from several studies which have found 
that group discussion tends to.influence individual verdict· 
and sentencing behavior (Gleason & Harris, 1976; Myers & 
Kaplan, 1976). Other studies have considered the influence 
of the jury foreman on verdict and sentencing (Beran, Albert, 
Loiseaux, Mayfield, & Wright, 1958); the effects of assigned 
decision rule and number of members in the jury group (Davis, 
Kerr, Atkin, Holt, & Meek, 1975; Valenti & Downing, 1975)1 
primacy-recency effects in decision-making (Stone, 1969: ,. 
Wallace & Wilson, 1969; Wilson, 1971; Zdep & Wilson, 1968); 
and the effects of inadmissible evidence on jury decisions 
(Sue et al., 1973). 
In addition to the many topics of research in jury 
processes per~· several social.psychological theoretical 
positions must be considered in order to understand the jury 
from a psychological perspective. Two theoretical orienta-
tions central to this perspective are cognitive consistency 
and attribution theory as they relate to impression formation. v 
- The juror's basic duty in a court of criminal law is to listen 
to both sides of an issue, integrate the information he re-_ 
ceives, and arrive at a decision regarding the truth in the 
case. In fulfilling these duties, he is presented with infor-
mation about a crime and a defendant, and must form some opin-
ion regarding the likelihood of the defendant's guilt or 
innocence. 
Social psychological research has demonstrated that 
people tend to integrate information by a process of weight-
ing and averaging the bits of information th~y receive. If 
the information they get is inconsistent, the weighting of 
the information in this process changes (Abelson, 1968; 
Anderson, 1965a; Feldman, 1968). Singer (1968) views infor-
mation integration as a stimulus-processing mechanism which 
tends to, if necessary, distort objectively inconsistent 
material in order to maintain cognitive consistency. This 
distortion can be accomplished in at least three ways1 dis-
counting, assimilation, and attention decrement. These 
three methods of maintaining cognitive consistency result in 
either a primacy or a recency effect, depending upon the 
method of information presentation. 
When one final evaluative response is required of the 
subject after a set of stimuli is introduced, a primacy 
effect may be expected (Anderson, 1965b; Anderson & Jacobson, 
1965; Asch, 1946). This effect is demonstrated in these sit-
uations because, presumably, the subject receives the first 
parts of the information set and immediately begins making a 
judgment. Once this preliminary judgment (attribution) is 
made, he either assimilates further information into the 
existing cognitive structure, or diseounts it (Warr & Knapper, 
1968). On the other hand, when evaluative responding is re-
quired after each item, or when pronunciation or repetition v-· 
of the stimuli is required, recency effects emerge (Anderson, ~ 
1965a; Stewart, 196)). Hendrick and Costanini (1970) rein-
terpret both primacy and recency effects as resulting from 
attention decrement; all of the methodological procedures 
mentioned above, in effect, redistribute attention across 
the stimuli set, and the results consequently support the 
attention decrement interpretation. 
Overview of the Present Study 
The research completed by social psychologists in the 
/ 
area of cognitive consistency suggests that knowledge of 
prior criminal record does bias verdict; in any case, the 
justice system in this country has asserted that it does. 
By combining the presence or absence of this information with 
level of apparent guilt, the effects of knowledge of prior 
record and levels of evidence on the verdict behavior of 
jury groups can be determined. 
Considering the previous investigations in the area of 
cognitive consistency, as well as the prior research on 
juries, several expectations regarding the effects of com-
bining these two independent variables become apparent. The 
two conditions of trial procedure should lead to vastly dif-
fering verdicts since early introduction of the defendant's 
prior criminal record might lead the jurors to make an attri-
bution of deviance or criminality. Information following 
this early "judgment" would be somewhat distorted by either 
assimilation or discounting, if it is inconsistent with the 
early attribution. Juries in the one-stage trial proceeding 
are expected to reach a verdict more quickly and sentence 
more severly since they will presumably be more certain of 
the defendant's guilt after making the attribution of deviance 
based upon his previous criminal record. 
Verdict behavior, sentencing, and deliberation time are 
expected to vary significantly across evidence conditions, 
since each jury will be exposed to a specific weighting of 
evidence designed to manipulate his certainty of guilt or 
innocence. Juries in the ambiguous condition should 
deliberate the longest and be most disparate in their 
verdicts since certainty of guilt or innocence will be 
lowest. 
The cognitive consistency literature indicates that 
individual jurors should rate the defendant more negatively 
after a guilty verdict than after a verdict of not guilty. 
It is also expected that those who return a guilty verdict 
will perceive evidence damaging to the defendant's case as 
most important, whereas those who find the defendant not 
guilty will rate non-damaging evidence as most important. 
CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
The methodology for this study represents a compromise 
between two major considerations in doing social psycholo-
gical researcht mundane realism and experimental cost. 
Mundane realism refers to the use of a methodology which 
transcends the laboratory and enables the researcher to gen-
eralize findings to actual situations encountered in the real 
world. It is important in jury research not only to enhance 
generalizability of research results but also to intensify 
subjects' involvement in the experiment. In this study, sub-
jects were exposed to a trial procedure resembling the pro-
cess used in criminal courts. In addition, many of the 
materials used during the trial and deliberations were dupli-
cates of printed forms used in the legal system. 
Mundane realism must be weighed against experimental 
cost in terms of time, subjects, and materials required. 
Because of these considerations, two major exceptions to the 
ideal of maximum realism were necessary. First, although 
subjects viewed trial evidence which had been videotaped in 
a courtroom, they were not in an actual courtroom when they 
observed the trial and were aware, of course, that they were 
not really deciding the fate of a defendant. The second 
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exception was that this study employed six-person juries 
instead of the 12-person juries used in Oklahoma felony 
courts. The experimental procedures used were selected as 
a reasonable compromise between.mundane realism and experi-
mental cost. 
Subjects 
The subjects were 216 students solicited from undergrad-
uate psychology classes at Oklahoma State University. Each 
subject satisfied two legal criteria in order to serve in 
this study: he or she was eighteen years of age or older 
with no prior felony convictions. These criteria were appro-
priate since they satisfied the legal requirements for a 
citizen to serve as an actual juror in a civil or criminal 
case in Oklahoma. Subjects were recruited in groups of 18 
for each of 12 experimental sessions. Each subject was 
exposed to one of the six treatment combinations. 
Experimental Design 
A 2 X 3 completely randomized factorial design was used, 
with all treatments fixed. The two independent variables 
manipulated, and their levels, were Type of Trial (one-stage 
versus bifurcated) and Level of Evidence (high guilt versus 
ambiguous versus low guilt). 
The dependent variables included jury verdict (guilty, 
not guilty). recommended length of sentence, and length of 
deliberation. The deliberation times required to reach a 
verdict and to assign sentence (if the verdict was guilty) 
were recorded separately. The deliberation time in each 
condition was measured from the time the deliberation room 
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door was closed until deliberations ceased. Further, each 
deliberation was tape recorded to assure accurate assessment 
of deliberation time. This procedure was especially impor-
tant for the one-stage proceeding in which the deliberations 
for verdict and sentencing were uninterrupted. 
Immediately following jury deliberation, jurors rated 
the d~fendant using an abbreviated form of the semantic 
differential scale, answered questions measuring their recall 
of information about the trial, and rated eight items of 
evidence in order of importance. The semantic differential 
was correlated with the other two measures. These three 
paper/pencil tasks were included in order to gain insight 
into the subjects' process of information integration. 
Materials 
Stimulus Materials 
Six videotapes were used which constituted the manipu-
lation of the two independent variables. A videotape was 
made to represent each of the six cells generated by the Type 
of Trial X Level of Evidence design. The evidence presented 
in these tapes was based on an actual criminal proceeding 
held in Payne County, Oklahoma, in January of 1975. 1 This 
1state of Oklahoma vs. Salinas and Karlin, No. CRF-74-260. 
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trial evidence was adjusted in order to create the three 
evidence conditions. The complete script used for the tape 
indicating the ambiguous condition is presented in Appendix A. 
The information about the defendant's prior criminal 
record was also included in the tapes. For the one-stage 
trial condition, this information was inserted at the begin-
ning of the prosecuting attorney's cross-examination of the 
• 
defendant. In the bifurcated condition, it was presented 
immediately prior to the judge's instructions for sentencing. 
The crime of which the defendant was accused in the present 
trial was robbery by force, a felony which, in Oklahoma, 
calls for a sentence of 5 to 50 years of incarceration. The 
prior record of the defendant reflected a previous conviction 
for forgery. Although the two crimes differed in that the 
crime involved in the present trial included a face-to-face 
confrontation with the victim, whereas the prior conviction 
did not, they were similar in that both involved theft and 
neither included the use of a dangerous weapon. 
The videotapes for the three evidence conditions were 
judged independently by undergraduate psychology students 
prior to the experiment. These students viewed one of the 
three trials, then indicated whether they believed the defen-
dant to be guilty or not guilty and rated the effectiveness 
of each attorney. The trials viewed contained only evidence; 
the judge's instructions and the information about the defen-
dant's prior record were omitted for these ratings, so that 
their opinions would be based upon the evidence alone. 
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In addition to these videotapes, typewritten information 
regarding the defendant's past criminal record was prepared 
for distribution at the appropriate time during each trial 
(Appendix B). This practice was adopted in accordance with 
current legal practices; in actual courtroom procedure, when 
jurors are informed of a defendant's past record, they are 
provided with copies of the judgment certificate for the 
previous conviction. The prior conviction information was 
held constant throughout all treatment conditions. 
Materia1s Used During Deliberation 
The juries required several types of material during 
their deliberations. Ballot slips, pencils, and forms for 
recording the verdict and sentence were provided. The ballot 
slips were secretly coded so that the voting process could be 
subsequently reconstructed. The design of the verdict and 
sentencing forms approximated, as closely as possible, the 
form used in actual court cases. A copy of both of these 
latter forms is included in Appendix c. 
Post-Deliberation Materials 
Three measurement instruments were utilized by the jurors 
after their deliberations were completeds an abbreviated 
semantic differential scale for rating the defendant, a 
questionnaire eliciting subjects' recall of evidence, and 
a form for rating the importance of items of evidence. 
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Semantic differential. The abbreviated form of the 
semantic differential scale consisted of a single item to 
measure each of three dimensionss potency, activity, and 
evaluation. The. nine-point bipolar adjectives used to eli-
cit the jurors' rating of the defendant's potency, activity, 
and evaluation were "weak-strong," "active-inactive," and 
"good-bad," respectively. The higher the score (1-9) on each 
item, the greater the degree of each dimension indicated. A 
copy of this scale is presented in Appendix D. 
Evidence recall. The evidence recall questionnaire 
(Appendix E) included ten multiple-choice questions designed 
to test the jurors' ability to remember general facts about 
the case, such as the defendant's name and where the crime 
took place. 
Evidence importance. The evidence importance form, 
included in Appendix F, was composed of a random listing of 
eight major points of evidence included in each of the video-
tapes. A complete listing of the eight items of evidence 
included on the evidence importance instrument is presented 
in Appendix G. This listing also indicates whether each item 
was varied across the different evidence conditions as well 
as its association (if any) with the defendant's guilt or 
innocence. Four of these items were changed across evidence 
conditions and four were not. The jurors were required to 
rate each of the items as to perceived importance, a rating 
of "l" indicating highest importance and 11 8, 11 low importance. 
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Procedure 
Three six-person juries were formed for each experi-
mental session. Upon arrival, subjects were assigned ran-
domly to the three juries. This randomization was 
accomplished by having each subject draw one poker chip 
from a paper bag. The bag contained six each of red, blue, 
and white chips (for the three juries), plus enough yellow 
chips (for alternates) to complete the number of subjects 
who had reported for the experimental session. This pro-
cedure was followed by a verbal orientation to jury service 
(Appendix H) and the standard oath that prospective jurors 
swear in real jury duty. 
A short voir dire was then conducted to increase mundane 
realism and to enhance the subjects' involvement in the study. 
During this voir dire. each subject was directed to talk a 
little about himself/herself, giving his/h~r name, home town, 
and college major. Each subject was then asked two or three 
questions (see Appendix I) by the defense ~nd prosecution 
attorneys who were present. These attorneys were undergrad-
uate research assistants majoring in pre-law. 
Following the voir dire, the juries in the one-stage 
trial condition viewed one of its three videotapes (contain-
ing information about the defendant's prior record). After 
viewing the trial, the jurors received further instructions 
(Appendix J), retired to a deliberation room to reach aver-
dict and, in the case of a guilty verdict, to recommend 
punishment. Jurors then completed the three paper/pencil 
tasks, were debriefed, received credit slips, and were 
dismissed. 
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The experimental procedure differed for juries in the 
bifurcated trial condition. After completion of the voir 
dire, these juries viewed one of its three videotapes, with-
out receiving the defendant's past criminal record. After 
viewing the videotape, they retired to reach a verdict. If 
they determined that the defendant was not guilty, they then 
complet~d the three paper/pencil tasks, and were debriefed, 
provided with experimental credit slips, and dismissed. If 
a guilty verdict was rendered, however, the jurors returned 
to the courtroom, where they were informed of the defendant's 
prior criminal record and were given additional judge's 
instructions. They retired again to determine punishment. 
Once they had recommended punishment, they completed the 
paper/pencil tasks, were debriefed, received credit slips, 
and were dismissed. The time required for each experimental 
session was approximately two hours. 
Since 24 (rather than the minimum 18) subjects were 
recruited for each experimental session, more than 18 sub-
jects appeared for some of the sessions. These additional 
subjects were used as a control. Acting as jury alternates, 
they were exposed to the same experimental conditions but 
reached their verdict and completed the additional paper/pen-
cil tasks individually. This control was planned so that the 
behavior of the jury groups could be compared with that of 
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individuals on a £Ost hoc basis, to assess the influences of 
group discussion and group processes on information integra-
tion and decision-making. 
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
This study manipulated two independent variables: Level 
of Evidence (high apparent guilt, ambiguous, and low apparent 
guilt) and Type of Trial (one-stage and bifurcated). A 
detailed presentation of information about these juries is 
included in Appendix K. Analyses of variance were used to 
determine the effects of these variables on juries' verdicts, 
sentences, and deliberation times. 
In addition to these analyses of jury behavior, several 
juror behaviors were examined using analyses of variance and 
correlation procedures. Analyses of variance assessed the 
effects of the independent variables upon the jurors' seman-
tic differential ratings of the defendant, their ability to 
recall information about the trial, and their importance 
ratings of eight items of evidence. Correlation coefficients 
were used to identify interrelationships among the semantic 
differential ratings, recall of information, and evidence 
importance ratings. All reported correlations are statisti-
cally significant at the .05 level or less; no non-significant 
correlations are reported. Jury and juror analyses are 
reported separately. 
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Several juror substitutions occurred as a result of 
challenges for cause during the voir dire by both the defense 
attorney and the prosecutor. These substitutions served to 
increase mundane realism and external validity. A total of 
five females and four males were pre-empted. In each case a 
same-sexed alternate was substituted, and the pre-empted 
juror joined the panel .of alternates. Of the total of nine 
pre-empted jurors, five had relatives in law enforcement, 
three had been victims of crime, and one had previously 
served on a jury. 
Jury Processes 
Verdict 
All 36 of the juries were required to deliberate until 
a unanimous verdict was reached. A guilty verdict was scored 
"O" and a verdict of not guilty, "l." Two of the 36 juries 
initially reported being unable to reach a unanimous verdict 
("hung"). ~rury group nine, which was in the high guilt, 
bifurcated condition, was split 4-2 (four guilty, two not 
guilty) when they declared themselves hung; group 15 (in the 
ambiguous evidence, one-stage condition) was split 2-4 (two 
guilty, four not guilty). Both juries were instructed again 
to reach a unanimous verdict; both juries eventually voted 
guilty. 
Jury 15 was also one of the two groups in which the 
majority changed their opinions to reach a final unanimous 
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verdict, the other group being Jury 24. Jury 15, in the 
one-stage, ambiguous evidence condition, had a 2-4 split (two 
guilty, four not guilty) on the first ballot, but returned a 
final verdict of guilty. Jury 24, in the bifurcated, ambig-
uous condition, began with a 4-2 split (four guilty, two not 
guilty), but the final verdict was not guilty. 
A total of seven of the 36 ,juries returned a guilty 
verdict. Of these seven, five had viewed the videotapes 
depicting high apparent guilt, and two juries had viewed the 
ambiguous guilt tape. With regard to Type of Trial, five 
had participated in the one-stage trial proceeding and two 
had participated in the bifurcated proceeding. Both of 
these latter juries had viewed the high guilt tape. 
A 2 X 3 analysis of variance was performed; the results 
of this analysis are presented in Table I and the means 
appear in Table II. The manipulation of Level of Evidence 
was effective. More guilty verdicts were rendered as appar-
ent guilt increased, E (2, JO) = J.8, E<.034. The means 
of reported verdicts for the low, ambiguous, and high guilt 
conditions were l.OO, .83, and .58, respectively. None of 
the main or interaction effects for Type of Trial were signi-
ficant, although there was a trend for the one-stage trial to 
produce more guilt verdicts than the bifurcated version. 
Even though this relationship did not achieve statistical 
significance, the one-stage trial produced more than twice as 
many guilty verdicts as did the bifurcated trial (five in the 
one-stage trial versus two in the bifurcated trial). 
TABLE I 
JURY VERDICTS. 
Source D.F .. Sum of 
Squares 
Models 
Level of Evidence 2 1.0556 
Type of Trial 1 .2500 
Evidence X Type Trial 2 .1666 
Error 30 4.1667 
* ~ <. 034 
TABLE II 
MEANS FOR GROUP DATA 
Independent Variables N Verdict 
Level of Evidences 
High Apparent Guilt 12 • 5833 
Ambiguous Guilt 12 .8333 
Low Apparent Guilt 12 1.0000 
Type of Trial 1 
One-Stage 18 .7222 
Bifurcated 18 • 8889 
Evidence X Type Trials 
High Guilt X One-Stage· 6 .5000 
Hi~h Guilt X Bifurcated 6 .6667 
Ambiguous X One-Stage 6 .6667 
Ambiguous X Bifurcated 6 1.0000 
Low Guilt X One-Stage 6 1.0000 
Low Guilt X Bifurcated 6 1. 0000 
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F-Value PR) F 
J.80 * 1.80 NS 
.60 NS 
Deliberation 
Time, Verdict 
23.73 minutes 
17.89 minutes 
9.40 minutes 
22.89 minutes 
11.12 minutes 
27.30 minutes 
20.15 minutes 
27.38 minutes 
8.40 minutes 
lJ.98 minutes 
4.82 minutes 
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Deliberation Time and Sentencing 
The deliberation time for each jury was measured in 
minutes from the beginning of the deliberation until a ver-
dict was reported by the jury foreman. The results of the 
analysis of variance for this dependent variable are pre-
sented in Table III. Deliberation time tended to increase 
as apparent guilt increased, F (2, 30) = 3.08, Q < .06. The 
means for low, ambiguous, and high guilt conditions were, 
respectively, 9.4, 17.9, and 23.7 minutes. The Type of 
Trial main effect, however, was significant, f (1, JO) = 6.17, 
l?. <. 02. When the past record of the defendant was known to 
the jurors as they deliberated, the deliberation time was 
more than twice as great as the time required without know-
ledge of the defendant's past record (Ms = 22.9 minutes and 
11.1 minutes, respectively). The Level of Evidence X Type of 
Trial interaction was not significant. Overall, deliberation 
time tended to increase with the defendant's apparent guilt, 
and increased significantly when ,iurors knew of his prior 
criminal record. 
An examination of the deliberation times and sentences 
of the seven juries who returned guilty verdicts suggests an 
interesting pattern (see Table IV). When these data are 
re-arranged in order of the length of deliberation time needed 
for reaching a verdict, shorter deliberation time for verdict 
appears to be associated with more punitiveness in sentencing. 
The first three juries, who averaged about 10 minutes in 
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TABLE III 
DELIBERATION TIME FOR VERDICT 
Source D. F. Sum of F-Value PR) F 
Squares 
Model: 
Level of Evidence 2 1245.37 3.08 * Type of Trial 1 1246.09 6.17 ** Evidence X Type Tr:ial 2 240.46 .60 NS 
Error 30 6057. 52 
* p (.06 
** 12 (.02 
Group Initial Level of 
Split Evidence 
(G/NG) 
1 5/1 High Guilt 
4 4/2 High Guilt 
6 4/2 High Guilt 
8 5/1 High Guilt 
9 4/2 High Guilt 
15 2/4 Ambiguous 
16 4/2' Ambiguous 
RE-ARRANGED IN ASCENDING ORDER OF 
DELIBERATION TIME, VERDICTs 
8 5/1 High Guilt 
1 5/1 High Guilt 
6 4/2 High Guilt 
4 4/2 High Guilt 
15 2/4 Ambiguous 
16 4/2 Ambiguous 
9 4/2 High Guilt 
TABLE IV 
GUILTY VERDICT GROUPS 
Type of Deliberation 
Trial Time 
Verdict 
One-Stage 13.4 minutes 
One-Stage 32.0 minutes 
One-Stage 15.0 minutes 
Bifurcated 4.1 minutes 
Bifurcated 57.2 minutes 
One-Stage 4).) minutes 
One-Stage 52.4 minutes 
Bifurcated 4.~ . One-Stage lJ.4. M=l0 .. 8 
One-Stage 15. 
One-Stage 32.0 
One-Stage 43.1 One-Stage 52.4 M=51.0 
Bifurcated 57.2 
Deliberation 
Time 
Sentence 
4.2 minutes 
2.0 minutes 
2.J minutes 
7.2 minutes 
5.5 minutes 
1.2 minu.tes 
1.1 minutes 
7,~ 4.2 M=J.9 
2.3 
2.0 l.2J 1.1 00=2.6 
5.5 
Sentence 
40 years 
5 years 
10 years 
15 years 
10 years 
5 years 
5 years 
11 40 M=21.7 
10 
5 ~} M=6,7 
10 
N 
°' 
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verdict deliberating, assessed a heavier punishment (M = 21.7 
years) than did the three juries who averaged 51 minutes for 
deliberation and assessed a mean punishment of only 6.7 
years. The correlation of the deliberation time for verdict 
with the sentence imposed was -.54, which is, however, not 
statistically significant. 
Juror Behavior 
In addition to the statistical analyses of the juries' 
behavior, the 216 jurors were considered individually as 
well. As stated previously, dependent variables for the 
jurors included responses on an abbreviated form of the sem-
antic differential, evidence recall, and evidence importance 
ratings. 
Analyses of variance were performed on these dependent 
variables; Table V presents means for each independent var-
iable and for interaction combinations. In addition to these 
analyses, correlation coefficients, as previously outlined, 
were computed. The correlations may be examined using 
Table VI. The dependent variables will be considered 
separately. 
Verdict 
For the purposes of this correlational analysis, each 
juror's verdict was considered the same as that voted unani-
mously by his/her group. 
TABLE V 
MEANS FOR INDIVIDUAL DATA 
Independent Variables Pot. Act. Eval. Amt. Bar-
Money tender's 
Found Tes ti-
on Def. mony 
Evidence (N=72 each)1 
High Apparent Guilt 4.90 4.88 4.33 2.91 3.36 
Ambiguous 5.22 5.19 4.80 4. :n 4.48 
Low Apparent Guilt 5. 56 5.44 4.98 4.88 2.04 
Type Trial (N=l08 each)1 
4.51 3.24 One-Stage 4.87 5.18 3.73 
Bifurcated 5.59 5.16 4.89 4.)6 3.35 
Interaction (N=36 each)1 
Hi Guilt X One-Stage 4.58 5.11 4.38 2.55 3.27 
Hi Guilt X Bifurcated . 5, 22 4.66 4.27 3.27 3.44 
Arnbig. X One-Stage 4.69 5.19 4.58 4.36 4.05 
Arnbig. X Bifurcated 5.75 5.19 5.02 4.30 4.91 
Lo Guilt X One-Stage 5. 33 .. 5.25 4.58 4.27 2.38 
Lo Guilt X Bifurcated 5.80 5.63 5.38 5.50 1.69 
Claim Def. 's 
by Lack 
Victim of 
Corrob. 
3.05 6.08 
3.70 5.83 
3.93 6.70 
J.46 5.88 
3.66 6.52 
3.16 5.94 
2.94 6.22 
3.50 5.52 
3.91 6.13 
3.72 6 •. 19 
4.13 7.22 
Absence 
of 
Stains 
5.33 
J.69 
3.62 
4.62 
J.81 
5.55 
5.11 
4.08 
3.30 
4.22 
3.02 
N 
co 
TABLE VI 
CORRELATIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL SUBJECTS 
Semantic Diff. Evidence Imnortance (Im 
Pot. Act. Eval. Imp 1 Imp 2 Imp 3 Imp 4 Imp 5 Imp 7 Imp 
Verdict .25** .41** -.Jl** 
.27** .24** Potency 
Eval. 
Imp 1 
Imp 2 
Imp 3 
Imp 4 
Imp 5 
Imp 6 
* :g{.05 
** E. < .005 
Imp 11 
Imp 2: 
Imp 31 
Imp 41 
Amt. of Alcohol Consumed 
Physician's Testimony 
Amt. of Money in Def.'s Possession 
Bartender's Testimony 
.27** 
.17* 
.19* 
.20** 
.16* 
.28** 
.15* 
.22** 
-.47** -.15* 
-.lJ* 
-
0 35** -.20** 
-.JO** -.23** -.18* -.21** 
Imp 51 
Imp 6: 
Imp 71 
Imp 81 
-·33** -.17* -.14* 
-.28** -.19* 
-•14* 
-.28** 
-.16* -.15* 
Victim's Claim of Seeing Defendant 
Defendant's Lack of Corroboration 
Absence of Stains on Def.'s Clothes 
Def. 's Account of His Own Actions 
N 
'° 
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Guilty verdicts. Verdicts of guilty were associated 
with jurors' attributions of low evaluation (r=.41) and low 
potency (r=.25) on their semantic differential ratings of 
the defendant. In addition, three evidence items were rela-
ted to guilty verdicts. Two of these factors involve the 
testimony of the defendants the amount of money found on 
the defendant when he was arrested ( r=.• 27) and the defen-
dant's lack of corroboration for his account of his own 
actions the night of the robbery (r=.28). The third factor, 
the victim's claim that he saw the defendant's face while 
being attacked (r=.19), involves an eyewitness account by the 
victim. This latter item gives credence to the notion that 
people generally believe eyewitnesses. Jurors who voted 
guilty believed this testimony, and rated it as important, 
even though the victim, in all conditions, was admittedly 
dazed and lying on the ground when he saw his attacker. 
Not guilty verdicts. Verdicts of not guilty were 
associated with three points of evidence. The amount of al-
cohol consumed by the victim and defendant (r=.Jl) was varied 
with the level of evidence, being the highest in the low 
guilt condition, thus perhaps leading the jurors to question 
the victim's testimony in that condition as well as in the 
ambiguous condition, where a significant proportion of ver-
dicts of not guilty were reported. The absence of stains on 
the defendant's clothes when arrested (r=.4?) and the defen-
dant's account of his own actions on the night of the crime 
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(r=.15) were held constant in all conditions, and would 
seemingly indicate innocence on his part. 
Verdict Change 
This dependent variable reflects whether each juror's 
final verdict (the jury's verdict) was the same as or differ-
ent from his/her initial opinion. A total of 51 jurors (23%) 
in the 36 juries indicated that they had changed their 
opinions during their deliberation. 1 
These 51 jurors were matched with 51 others who did not 
change to see if they differed in regard to their responses 
on the semantic differential scales and evidence importance 
ratings. Each of the 51 "non-changers" was chosen randomly 
from the same jury as his/her matched counterpart who 
changed. No comparisons were significant. 
Recall .2f Evidence 
The jurors demonstrated little variability in their 
ability to recall the ten items of information about the 
trial. A mean of 9.74 indicated that all the jurors made a 
perfect or near-~erfect score on this recall test. Evidence 
recall, therefore, was not significantly associated with any 
of the other dependent variables. 
1The self-reported indication of opinion change was 
recorded on a questionnaire which was not included in this 
study, but was part of another research desing using these 
same subjects. Self-reports were verified by examining the 
ballot slips which the jurors used during their delibe~ations. 
Semantic Differential 
Upon completion of the deliberations, each juror com-
pleted an abbreviated semantic differential scale. Each 
component of this scale will be reported separately. 
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Potency. Both evidence condition and type of trial 
viewed significantly affected the jurors' judgment of the 
potency of the defendant (Table VII). As apparent guilt in-
creased, potency decreased, F (2, 210) = 4.01, 12.<.0l. The 
means reflecting this relationship are 4.9 for high and 5.5 
for low apparent guilt, Further, jurors who had viewed the 
one-stage version of the trial rated him as significantly 
less potent than those who had participated in the bifurcated 
trial, F (1, 210) = 14.12, 12.(.0002; M_s = 4.8 for the 
one-stage and 5.5 for the bif~rcated trial. Overall, jurors 
tended to see the defendant as weaker when the evidence indi-
cated high guilt and when the trial proceeding was one-stage. 
High potency was correlated with low importance on two 
points of evidences the amount of money found on the defen-
dant when arrested (r=.17), and the defendant's lack of 
corroboration (r=.15). In addition, it was related to high 
importance of the absence of stains on the defendant's 
clothes ( r= .13). 
The first item of evidence, the amount of money that the 
defendant had when arrested, was varied according to evidence 
condition, being highest in the high apparent guilt condition. 
The second point of evidence, the defendant's lack of 
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TABLE VII 
SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIALt POTENCY 
Source D. F. Sum of F-Value PR) F 
Squares 
Model1 
Level of Evidence 2 16.009 4.01 * Type of Trial 1 28.166 14.12 ** Evidence X Type Trial 2 3.250 • 81 NS 
Error 210 419.000 
* I!.< • 02 
** ~ < .0002 
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corroboration, was held constant in all conditions, as was 
the third, the absence of stains on the defendant's clothes. 
Since perceived guilt was related to potency, the jurors' 
ranking of these items is as it should be. Those who rated 
the defendant as "potent" perceived non-damaging evidence as 
important and damaging evidence as relatively unimportant. 
Activitx. Although no relationships were statistically 
significant, the evidence variable approached significance, 
F (2, 210) = 2.7, J2.(.07 (Table VIII). The means were 4.8 
and 5.4 for high and low apparent guilt, respectively. The 
relationship between strength of evidence and ratings of 
activity was, therefore, marginal--higher guilt was associa-
ted with jurors' opi~ions of the defendant as somewhat 
inactive. 
Evaluation. Individual ratings on the evaluation dimen-
sion were significantly affected by both· independent variables 
and their interaction. These results are presented in Table 
IX. As apparent guilt guilt increased, evaluation decreased, 
F (2, 210) = 6.21, £(.002. The mean evaluation in the high 
apparent guilt condition was 4.3, and 4.98 in the low guilt 
condition. In addition, participation in the one-stage trial 
was associated with a lower evaluation, F (1, 210) = 5.9, 
J2.(.015. The means for the one-stage and bifurcated trials 
were 4.51 and 4.89, respectively. The Level of Evidence X 
Type of Trial interaction was significant, also, f (2, 210) = 
2.91, E (.05. The defendant was rated more favorably in the t 
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TABLE VIII 
SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL: ACTIVITY 
Source D. F. Sum of F-Value PR) F 
Squares 
Models 
Level of Evidence 2 11.148 2.70 * 
Type of Trial 1 .018 .01 NS 
Evidence X Type Trial 2 6.259 i.51 NS 
Error 210 433.888 
* Q. <. 069 
TABLE IX 
SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIALt EVALUATION 
Source D.F. Sum of F-Value PR} F 
Squares 
Models 
Level of Evidence 2 16.361 6.21 * Type of Trial l 7.782 5.90 ** Evidence X Type Trial 2 7.675 2.91 *** 
Error 210 276.805 
* Q. < . 002 
** Q. <. 02 
*** Q. < • 05 
.. 
bifurcated trial combined with the ambiguous and low apparent 
guilt conditions; but in the high apparent guilt condition, 
higher ratings occurred in the one-stage trial. Table V 
presents these means. 
An examination of the correlations indicates that posi-
tive evaluation was associated with the importance of the 
absence of stains on the defendant's clothes (r=.J5) and with 
the defendant's account of his own actions on the night of 
the crime (r=.20). Negative evaluation was related to the 
amount of money found on the defendant (r=.19), the claim by 
the victim that he saw the defendant's face during the attack 
(r=ol6), and the defendant's lack of corroboration for his 
activities on the night of the robbery (r=.22). Jurors who 
rated the defendant as "good," then, tended to judge less 
damaging evidence as important; jurors who rated him as "bad" 
tended to place importance on more damaging items. 
Summary. The overall results of the semantic differen-
tial ratings suggest that high apparent guilt and participa-
tion in the one-stage version of the trial is associated with 
a perception of the defendant as a weak, relatively inactive, 
"bad" person. Jurors who viewed the bifurcated trial or evi-
dence indicating low guilt perceived him as strong, somewhat 
active, and "good." 
The ratings of evidence importance appear to be aligned 
appropriately. In general, damaging evidence was rated as 
important by ,jurors who perceived the defendant as "bad" and 
Yt 
( 
"weak," and non-damaging items of evidence were seen as 
\ 
important by those jurors who rated the defendant "gobd" and 
"strong." 
Evidence Imnortance Ratings 
Information regarding the items of evidence included in 
the videotapes are presented in Appendix G. This table lists 
the items of evidence, whether ea~h was changed across evi-
dence conditions, and, if so, in what direction. These 
changes were made in order to incr'ease damaging information 
in the high guilt condition and to decrease it in the low 
guilt condition. Overall, the item considered most important 
by the jurors was the bartender's testimony (M = 3.3); the 
one seen as least important was the defendant's lack of 
corroboration (M = 6.2). Mean importance ratings for the 
eight items of evidence are presented in Table x. 
Amount of alcohol consumed Qy victim and defendant. 
Neither of the independent variables was significantly re-
lated to the perceived importance of this item. 
The correlations between this item of evidence and the 
other seven, however, yielded several statistically signifi-
cant correlation coefficients. The perceived importance of 
this item was inversely related to the importance of four 
otherss the amount of money found on the defendant when he 
was arrested (r=-.30); the bartender's testimony (r=-.23); 
the victim's claim that he saw the defendant's face during 
Item 
Number 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
? 
8 
TABLE X 
OVERALL MEAN IMPORTANCE RATINGS 
FOR ITEMS OF EVIDENCE 
Description 
Amount of Aleohol Consumed by Victim 
and Defendant 
Physician's Testimony 
Amount of Money Found on Defendant 
When Arrested 
Bartender's Testimony 
Victim's Claim of Seeing Defendant's 
Face During Attack 
Defendant's Lack of Corroboration 
Absence of Stains on Defendant's 
Clothes When Arrested 
Defendant's Account of His Own Actions 
on the Night of the Crime 
JS 
Mean 
Rating 
4.32 
6.03 
4.07 
3.30 
3.59 
6.21 
4.11 
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the attack (r=-.18); and the defendant's lack of corroboration 
(r=-.21). Those jurors who perceived alcohol consumption as 
important, rated the latter items as relatively unimportant, 
and vice versa. The first three of these four were changed 
across evidence conditions, as was alcohol consump.tion; the 
fourth item remained unchanged throughout all levels of 
evidence. 
Phvsician's testimony. The testimony of the physician 
was not significantly affected by either of the independent 
variables. This item remained unchanged throughout all evi-
dence conditions; in all cases the physician testified only 
as to the victim's injuries, verifying that he had indeed 
been beaten, but offering no evidence as to the identity of 
the perpetrator of the crime. In view of his role in the 
trial, the lack of statistical significance is reasonable. 
Even though the physician's testimony was not signifi-
cantly related to the independent variables, it was inversely 
correlated with the bartender's testimony (r=-.33), with the 
claim by the victim that he saw the defendant's face during 
the attack (r=-.17), and to the defendant's account of his 
own activities on the night of the crime (r=-,14). The indi-
vidual ratings for these items of evidence indicates that 
most jurors viewed the physician's testimony as somewhat less 
important than each of the other items. The average rating 
for the physician's testimony was 6.03, compared with 3.3, 
3.6, and J.9 for the others, respectively. This perception 
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of the evidence was very accurate, since the physician testi-
fied only as to the injuries of the victim, and never pre-
sented evidence either for or against the defendant. In 
contrast, it was the bartender, the victim. and the defendant 
whose testimony added evidence favoring the defendant's guilt 
or innocence. These latter items of evidence, therefore, 
should have been seen as more important, as indeed they were. 
Amount of money found .Q.D. defendant when arrested. The 
judged importance of this item of evidence was significantly 
affected both by Level of Evidence and by Type of Trial (see 
Table XI). As apparent guilt increased, the perceived impor-
tance of this i tern increased, F ( 2 • 210) = 19. 74, £ <. • 0001. 
Mean importance in the high guilt condition was 2.9, and 4.89 
in the low guilt condition. Further, jurors who viewed the 
one-stage trial perceived the amount of money found on the 
defendant as significantly more important than did those who 
participated in the bifurcated trial, f (1, 210) = 5.67, 
J2. (. 01. The mean rating of the ,iurors in the one-stage pro-
ceeding was 3.7, compared with 4.36 for those in the bifur-
cated proceeding. 
This item changed across evidence conditions. In the 
high guilt condition, the defendant had $70 in his possession 
when arrested; in the low guilt condition, $7. Compared with 
the other i terns listed, then, ,jurors cons.idered this one to 
be more important when the amount was greater. 
An examination of the correlations indicates that the 
TABLE XI 
AMOUNT OF MONEY FOUND ON DEFENDANT 
WHEN ARRESTED 
Source D.F. Sum of F-Value 
Squares 
Models 
Level of Evidence 2 148.925 19.74 
Type of Trial 1 21.407 5.67 
Evidence X Type Trial 2 14.925 1.98 
Error 210 792.277 
* !?. < • 0001 
** l2. < • 02 
41 
PR> F 
* 
** 
NS 
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importance of this item was inversely related to the per-
ceived importance of the absence of stains on the defendant's 
clothes when arrested (r=-.28) and the defendant's account 
of his own actions on the night of the crime (r=-.19). Both 
of the latter pieces of evidence are non-damaging, whereas 
the amount of money in the possession of the defendant was 
most damaging in the high guilt condition, and less damaging 
in the others. Jurors who viewed the more damaging evidence 
as important, therefore, considered non-damaging evidence as 
less important. 
Bartender's testimonv. Level of Evidence was signifi-
cantly related to the perceived importance of the bartender's 
testimony, .E (2, 210) = 26.85, 12(.0001 (Table XII). This 
item changed with level of evidence. In both the high guilt 
and ambiguous evidence conditions, the bartender testified 
that he saw the defendant follow the victim out of the bar, 
but his certainty differed; he was very certain of what he 
saw in the high guilt condition, but uncertain in the ambi-
guous condition. In the low guilt condition, the bartender 
testified for the defense, saying that he had seen the defen-
dant in the bar some minutes after the victim had left. 
The significant relationship between evidence condition 
and the importance ratings for this item is not linear. The 
item was rated most important in the low apparent guilt con-
dition (M = 2.0), less important in the high guilt condition 
(M = 3.36), and least important in the ambiguous condition 
4J 
TABLE XII 
BARTENDER'S TESTIMONY 
Source D.F. Sum of F-Value PR) F 
Squares 
Models 
Level of Evidence 2 215.564 26.85 * Type of Trial 1 .666 .17 NS 
Evidence X Type Trial 2 21.861 2.72 ** 
Error 210 842.944 
* Jl <. 0001 
** !?. < . 068 
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(M = 4.48). Considering the contents of his testimony, these 
perceptions of importance are reasonable. 
The main effect for the Type of Trial variable was non-
s ignificant; the interaction, however, was marginally signi-
ficant, F ( 2, 210) = 2. 72, E ( • 07. There was a trend for 
this testimony to be considered more important in the bifur-
cated version of the trial w}/.en the evidence indicated high 
apparent guilt and when it was ambiguous. In the low guilt 
condition, the testimony was rated as more important in the 
one-stage trial. These means are presented in Table v. 
Claim E:t: victim that he ~ defendant's face during the 
attack. This item of evidence was also altered across evi-
dence conditions. Although the victimts story remained con-
stant, the certainty of his testimony changed. In the low 
guilt condition, the defense attorney was able to cast 
serious doubt on the victim's ability to have seen who 
attacked him. In the high guilt condition, his testimony 
was not challenged. 
The main effect for the Level of Evidence variable was 
significant, F (2, 210) = 3.8, .!!< .023 (Table XIII). As 
apparent guilt increased, importance of this item increased; 
the means were 3.0, 3.7, and 3.9 for high, ambiguous, and 
low guilt, respectively. Type of Trial did not affect these 
ratings significantly. 
The perceived importance of this item was inversely cor-
related with that for the absence of stains on the defendant's 
TABLE XIII 
CLAIM BY VICTIM THAT HE SAW DEFENDANT'S 
FACE DURING ATTACK 
Source D.F. Sum of F-Value 
Squares 
Models 
Level of Evidence 2 29.787 3.80 
Type of Trial l 2.240 • 57 
Evidence X Type Trial 2 4.898 .63 
Error 210 822.166 
* :Q. < • 02 
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clothes when arrested (r=-.28). Since the victim's claim 
was indicative of guilt in the defendant, and the absence of 
stains was evidence of the defendant's innocence, a high im-
portance rating on either of .these would logically be asso-
ciated with a low rating on the other. 
Defendant's lack of corroboration. The Level of Evi-
dence variable significantly affected this item of evidence, 
F ( 2, 210) = 4. 23, :Q < • 01, Table XIV. Once again, a non-
linear relationship resulted, with the jurors who viewed the 
ambiguous tapes rating this item highest (M = 5.8); those 
viewing the high guilt trial rating it lower (M = 6.0); and 
those viewing the low guilt tapes rating it lowest in impor-
tance (M = 6.7). This time, the item did not change across 
evidence conditions. 
Participation in the one-stage trial was associated with 
a higher importance rating on this item, F (1, 210) = 6.38, 
E. <. 01. The mean importance·· of the defendant's lack of corro-
boration in the one-stage trial was 5.8, and 6.5 in the 
bifurcated trial. 
This item of evidence was perceived as most important in 
situations where other evidence indicated guilt. This conclu-
sion is supported by the fact·that high importance on this 
item was associated with low importance on two other itemss 
the absence of stains on the defendant's clothes when he was 
arrested (r=-.16) and the defendant's account of his own 
actions on the night of the crime (r=-.15). The defendant's 
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TABLE XIV 
DEFENDANT'S LACK OF CORROBORATION 
Source D.F. Sum of F-Value PR) F 
Squares 
Model: 
Level of Evidence 2 29.250 4.23 * Type of Trial 1 22.041 6.38 * Evidence X Type Trial 2 5.083 .74 NS 
Error 210 725.250 
* Q. < • 02 
J!Z.· 
lack of corroboration seems damaging, or at least weakens 
the defendant's case, whereas the absence of stains on his 
clothes and his own testimony are indicative of innocence. 
These inverse relationships are therefore logically consistent. 
Absence of stains .QQ defendant's clothes when arrested. 
This item did not change across evidence conditions, but as 
apparent guilt increased, its judged importance decreased, 
F (2, 210) = 15.0?, I?< .0001 (Table XV). The means for this 
item were 5.3, 3.69, and 3.62 in the high, ambiguous, and low 
guilt conditions, respectively. 
Type of Trial also significantly affected the importance 
ragings of this item, F (1, 210) = 7.84, Q(.005. The one-
stage trial condition was associated with lower ratings, a 
mean of 4.62 in the one-stage version versus a mean of 3.81 
in the bifurcated version. Since the absence of blood stains 
on the defendant's clothes is non-damaging, higher perceived 
importance of this item in the low guilt condition is logical. 
Summary of evidence importance ratings. Overall, the 
relationships between each of these items of evidence and the 
independent variables, and the interrelationships among the 
items themselves indicate that, in general, the jurors inte-
grated the information in a reasonable fashion. Evidence 
which was damaging to the defense case was, in general, seen 
as important in the high apparent guilt condition and in the 
one-stage version of the trial. Non-damaging evidence was 
perceived as important when low guilt was suggested or when 
TABLE XV 
ABSENCE OF STAINS ON DEFENDANT'S 
CLOTHES WHEN ARRESTED 
Source D. F •. Sum of F-Value 
Squares 
Models 
Level of. EvidEtnee . 2 1)4.6.20 l5.07 
Type of.· Tria1 1 J5.041 7.84 
Evidence X ··Type Trial 2 5.083 • 57 
Error 210 9)8.027 
' 
* l?. < • 0001 
** l?. < • 005 
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the trial was bifurcated. 
Considering the correlations among the items of evidence, 
the importance ratings are aligned in a logically consistent 
manner. Overall, items of evidence which were damaging were 
positively correlated with one another and negatively related 
with non-damaging evidence. Conversely, non-damaging items 
were positively related with one another, and inversely 
related with damaging evidence. 
Alternates 
Of the total of 39 alternates who participated in the 
research study, 14 were involved in the one-stage proceeding; 
three of these viewed evidence depicting high guilt, two, 
ambiguous, and nine, low guilt. Twenty-five alternates par~ 
ticipated in the bifurcated trial, six of which were in the 
high guilt condition, nine in the ambiguous condition, and 
ten in the low guilt condition. These alternates viewed the 
tapes along with the juries, though seated in a separate 
group, but did not deliberate. Immediately after viewing 
the trial, they rendered individual verdicts and completed 
the three paper/pencil tasks. 
Analyses of variance were computed in order to detect 
significant effects of the treatments upon the dependent 
variables of verdict, semantic differential dimensions, and 
evidence importance ratings. Results of significant effects, 
as well as the means involved, are presented in Appendix L. 
A comparison between data for the jurors and that for 
51 
alternates reveals that, overall, discussion did not change 
anything drastically, though some differences may be noted. 
Level of Evidence affected significantly the verdicts of the 
alternates, high apparent guilt .being associated with more 
guilt verdicts, F (2, 33) = 6.29, Q( .004. The effect for 
alternates, therefore, was even more marked than that for 
jurors. 
The semantic differential ratings of the alternates 
yielded less significant results than those of the jurors; 
the Type of Trial relationship with potency achieved near 
significance, F (1, 33) = 3.4, !?. <. 07. This was the only 
effect which the independent variables had on the semantic 
differential ratings of the alternates, contrasted with those 
of the jurors, where Level of Evidence affected ratings of 
all of the dimensions, and where Type of Trial affected 
potency and evaluation. 
For two of the eight items of evidence rated for impor-
tance, Level of Evidence hada significant effect on the 
perceptions of both jurors and alternates; in both cases the 
effects on the ratings of alternates were slightly less sig-
nificant than on those for jurors. For both jurors and 
alternates, the bartender's testimony was judged most impor-
tant in the low apparent guilt condition, less important in 
the high guilt condition, and least important in the ambi-
guous condition, this relationship achieving high signifi-
cance for the alternates, .E (2, 33) = Sli.77, £(.005. The 
second of these two items of evidence, the victim's claim of 
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seeing the defendant's face during the attack, achieved near 
significance for the alternates, F (2, 33) = 3.08, .2 < .06. 
High apparent guilt was associated with high importance on 
this item. It might be noted that these two items of evidence 
are the only ones which involve eyewitness testimony, and were 
rated, overall, as the most important by all alternates, again 
pointing up the tendency of jurors to emphasize the importance 
of eyewitness testimony. 
Concerning the remaining six of the items of evidence, 
there is a definite tendency for the treatments to have had 
a much greater effect on the ratings of the jurors than on 
those of the alternates. This suggests that group discussion 
may have had a "polarizing" effect on the jurors. During 
their deliberations, they perhaps relied upon one another to 
clarify the importance of the:various items of evidence pre-
sented. They emphasized certain evidence, which differed 
somewhat depending upon the version of the trial they had 
viewed. This reciprocal influence among the jurors expressed 
itself by railings which were more significantly affected by 
the trial and evidence conditions. 
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
The ,Turies 
Introduction 
All juries which participated in this research were 
faced with a more or less ambiguous situation. The high ap-
parent guilt tane presented evidence favoring the victim's 
testimony; the low apparent guilt tape showed evidence 
favoring the defendant's testimony. All were to some ex-
tent ambiguous, however, since none of the tapes presented 
physical evidence establishing the defendant as the assail-
ant. All evidence was presented through trial testimony. 
In every case, therefore, ~he jurors were confronted essen-
tially with the fundamental question of evaluating the credi-
bility of each witness. 
All juries expressed the desire for more testimony from 
more witnesses during their deliberations. They wanted not 
only reliable, credible witnesses, but eyewitnesses who 
actually viewed the assault. As one male juror commented 
during deliberation, "You could never say he did it unless 
someone actually saw him do it." They wanted, it seems, an 
"open and shut case," which could be decided with absolute 
certainty, even though jurors in actual litigation seldom 
try cases which are unambiguous. 
Since these jurors were confronted with an ambiguous 
case, they had to select the facts from lengthy testimony, a 
situation which closely matches the problem of most real-life 
jurors. During their deliberations, the jurors spent a sub-
stantial amount of time taking the role of another person. 
They spoke at length regarding their own personal experiences 
and what they would have done if they were the victim or the 
defendant. They used these personal experiences as a basis 
for speculating on the role and significance of factors such 
as the de~ree of intoxication of both the victim and defen-
dant, and whether or not the victim, in his dazed condition 
and prone position, would be capable of identifying the 
defendant as his assailant. 
For the jurors who believed the defendant to be innocent, 
the point most often used to s~ay the guilty-voting jurors 
was the factor of reasonable doubt. They discussed what 
"reasonable doubt" meant, and reminded each other of the 
principle of presumption of innocence, as expressed in the 
judge's instructions. 
Verdict 
Seven of the 36 juries returned a verdict of guilty; the 
remaining 29 found that the defendant was not guilty. Five 
of the seven who returned guilty verdicts were in the high 
apparent guilt evidence condition; the remaining two were in 
the ambiguous condition. Five juries who found the defendant 
guilty were in the one-stage trial condition (three in the 
high guilt, two in the ambiguous evidence conditions); the 
other two participated in the bifurcated trial, both in the 
high guilt evidence condition. 
In 34 of the J6 juries, the majority opinion as expressed 
on the first ballot turned out to be the final verdict of the 
group. In two cases, however, the majority changed their ver-
dicts in order to reach a final unanimous jury verdict. Jury 
15 (in the one-stage, ambiguous evidence condition) had a 2-4 
split (two guilty, four not guilty) on the first ballot, but 
returned a verdict of guilty. Jury 24 (bifurcated, ambiguous 
evidence condition) began with a 4-2 split (four guilty, two 
not guilty) on the first ballot, but the final verdict was 
not guilty. The change of the initial majority opinion in 
these juries appeared unrelated to the longer deliberation 
times. Although the time required for deliberation in Jury 
15 was 43.3 minutes (one of the longer times recorded), the 
time expended by Jury 24 was only 17.3 minutes. 
Apparently, the items of evidence emphasized by the 
juries who returned guilty verdicts differed from those em-
phasized by the juries voting not guilty. Three items of evi-
dence correlated significantly with a final verdict of guilty, 
and three with a verdict of not guilty. Juries who voted 
guilty emphasized the amount of money found on the defendant 
when he was arrested, the victim's eyewitness identification 
of the defendant as his assailant, and the defendant's lack 
of corroboration for his account of his own activities on 
the night of the crime. All of these items of evidence are 
damaging to the defendant, especially in the high apparent 
guilt condition. where most of the guilty verdicts were re-
turned. The juries which returned a verdict of not guilty 
emphasized the importance of the amount of alcohol consumed 
by the victim and defendant, the defendant's account of his 
own actions, and the absence of blood stains on his clothes 
when arrested. The first of these varied across evidence 
condition, but, judging from the course of conversation in 
the taped record of ·the deliberations, apparently was consi-
dered ambiguous in all conditions. Jurors relied on their 
own personal experience and debated whether or not the victim 
would have been intoxicated enough so that his eyewitness 
testimony should or should not receive much credence. The 
remaining two items of evidence, the defendant's alibi and 
the absence of stains on his clothes, were non-damaging, so 
their relationship with verdicts of not guilty is reasonable. 
The statistical relationship between verdict and evidence 
condition supports the reliability of the videotapes as being 
significantly different in perceived apparent guilt. These 
tapes had been previously rated by individuals who viewed them 
independently of the present research effort. On that pre-
vious occasion, the judge's instructions and introduction of 
the prior record were omitted, so that the ratings were based 
solely on the evidence presented. Those ratings indicated 
that the manipulation of evidence in the tapes was successful. 
Even though all the tapes are somewhat ambiguous, the signi-
ficant relationship between Level of Evidence and verdict in 
this study provides evidence that the manipulation of this 
independent variable w~s successful, and that the tapes can 
be used, therefore, with confidence in future research. 
Knowledge of a defendant's prior criminal record was 
expected to significantly affect the juror's verdicts. The 
relationship between Type of Trial and verdict did not 
achieve significance, however. Apparently, jurors were able 
to disregard a prior record when deliberating. The audio 
tapes of the deliberations indicated that, in most cases, the 
prior record was discussed, but generally in the context of 
the witness's credibility. Several jurors discussed it as 
possible "proof" of the defendant's guilt but in most cases 
other jurors reminded him or her of the judge's instructions, 
which outlined the proper consideration of the prior record. 
They considered the prior record in terms of the defendant's 
credibility as a witness but not as a general statement 
regarding the defendant's character. Knowledge of the prior 
record, therefore, did not predispose them toward a verdict 
of guilty. 
The conclusion that the presence of a prior record does 
not significantly affect a verdict has two limitations. First, 
the severity of both the previous and present crime is a fac-
tor that must be considered. If the previous conviction had 
involved a crime which was more severe than that indicated in 
this study--forgery--then the awareness of a prior conviction 
may have had a more pronounced effect on the jurors and their 
final verdict. If the present crime had been more severe, 
or if the amount of money taken had been greater, the jurors 
perhaps would have.been swayed by the knowledge of a previous 
conviction. 
A second consideration is that of relevancy of the pre-
vious crime to the present one. In this study, the prior 
conviction was for forgery, and the present case involved 
robbery by force. The two are similar in that theft was in-
volved in both and a dangerous weapon was not used in either. 
They were dissimilar, however, in that the previous convic-
tion did not include a face-to-face confrontation with a vic-
tim, nor did it involve physical violence. Perhaps if the 
two crimes had been more similar, the previous conviction 
would not have been disregarded as easily as it was by these 
jurors. These two factors, the severity of the crime, pre-
vious and present, and the relevancy of the prior crime to 
the present one, must be considered when discussing the 
effects of a prior conviction on a pending case. 
Deliberation Time for Verdict 
Both the level of apparent.guilt and the presence or 
absence of the prior criminal record had a significant effect 
on deliberation time for verdicts. As apparent guilt in-
creased, the amount of time required by the juries to reach 
a verdict increased. The juries in the high apparent guilt 
condition spent more time discussing the evidence. Since 
59 
the nature of the evidence, even in the high guilt condition, 
was somewhat ambiguous, jurors required more time in this 
condition to sort the facts and to determine the truth. The 
issue of reasonable doubt was raised in the high guilt con-
dition much more often than in the low guilt condition; this 
issue was not discussed at all in the majority of the juries 
who participated in.the low apparent guilt version of the 
trial. The jurors in this condition were presented with 
evidence which was ambiguous, but the damaging testimony was 
weakened by the witnesses' admission of uncertainty under 
cross-examination. Consequently, the task for these jurors 
was much easier and their deliberation time was substantially 
lower. In summary, the additional deliberation time for the 
juries in the high guilt version appeared to have been spent 
in a more thorough analysis of the evidence, considering the 
probability of the truth in each witness's testimony. 
Deliberation time for verdict was also significantly 
related to the independent variable of Type of Trial. When 
the jurors knew of the defendant's past criminal record 
while deliberating the verdict, the deliberation time was 
more than double the time juries needed when uninformed of 
the prior record. 
In listening to the audio tapes of the ,jury deliberations, 
it appears that the additional time in the one-stage trial 
condition was not spent discussing the past record. In most 
cases, no more than three minutes of the total deliberation 
time were used actually talking about the prior criminal 
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record. Apparently, the past record introduced more ambiguity 
into the situation. The jurors' dilemma of the possibility 
of freeing a guilty man versus incarcerating an innocent man 
was heightened. In general, the past record, although not 
used as evidence for conviction, was used as a basis for 
questioning the defendant's credibility. Generally, there-
fore, the jurors followed the judge's instructions regarding 
use of the past record. The increased desire to consider the 
defendant's veracity generalized to the other witnesses as 
well: the testimony of the victim and the bartender underwent 
similar examination. The members of one jury even doubted 
that the victim had been beaten: "He could have been drunk 
and fallen down and lost his wallet. Maybe that's how he got 
hurt." Jurors who were aware of the defendant's past record, 
then, spent the additional deliberation time repeatedly going 
over the points of evidence, scrutinizing it in detail for 
contradiction and probability of truth. 
One interesting trend emerged from examining the deliber-
ation time required for those juries who returned a guilty 
verdict. Higher deliberation time for verdict was associated, 
though not significantly, with punitiveness in sentencing in 
an inverse manner. 
The audio tapes provide insight into why long delibera-
tion times should be associated with short sentences. The 
juries who used less time to deliberate appeared to be rela-
tively certain of the verdict when they began deliberations, 
In two of the three juries with the shortest deliberation 
times, the first vote resulted in a 5-1 split (five guilty, 
one not guilty), so the quick verdict can be explained by 
social pressure to conform. The one juror who voted not 
guilty conformed quickly, relying on the majority opinion 
rather than attempting to change the opinions of the others. 
This situation produced a high certainty of guilt and a 
longer sentence. 
All of the juries who took longer to deliberate began 
with at least a 4-2 split (four guilty, two not guilty). The 
pressure to conform was less since the two jurors who voted 
not guilty were subsequently allied. The evidence was consi-
dered in more detail as each side attempted to sway the other. 
The repeated consideration of the evidence enhanced ambiguity 
for these jurors and decreased their certainty of the cor-
rectness of the guilty verdict. This decreased certainty 
expressed itself in terms of generally shorter sentences. 
The Jurors 
Semantic Differential Ratings 
An interpretation of the results of the abbreviated sem-
antic differential is relatively straightforward. In general, 
jurors who believed the defendant to be guilty rated him more 
negatively than those who believed him to be innocent. Fur-
ther, the correlations between these ratings and the evidence 
importance ratings were generally aligned in a consistent 
manner. 
Potency. Both Level of Evidence and Type of Trial were 
significantly related to the defendant's judged potency. The 
defendant was perceived as "weak" by jurors who had viewed 
evidence indicating apparent guilt and by those who had par-
ticipated in the one-stage version of the trial. In addition, 
potency was significantly correlated with the importance of 
three items of evidence listed on the evidence importance 
rating instrument. As potency decreased, the importance of 
these items increased. The ratings on potency are reasonable, 
therefore, since low potency is related to guilty verdicts 
and to high importance on these items of evidence, the first 
two of which were somewhat damaging to the defendant's case, 
and the third, ambiguous. 
Activity. The ratings on this dimension were not 
systematically affected by either independent variable, nor 
by the interaction. In addition, "activity" was not signifi-
cantly correlated with the importance ratings of any of the 
eight items of evidence. 
The testimony in all trials indicated that the defendant 
was unemployed and had been for some time. In all conditions, 
he was on unemployment compensation and had allowed the victim 
to buy all the drinks for both of them while they were in the 
bar together on the night of the crime. The jurors may have 
been impressed with these factors and reached their conclu-
sions about his ''activity" independently of the Level of 
Evidence and Type of Trial conditions. 
Evaluation. A significant relationship existed between 
each of the independent variables and the individual ratings 
of the defendant as "good" or "bad." High apparent guilt and 
participation in the one-stage trial were both associated 
with the individuals' judgment of the defendant as a "bad" 
person. Further, the ratings on this dimension correlated 
significantly with the perceived importance of several items 
of evidence. Paralleling the ratings on the potency dimen-
sion, these evidence items were aligned appropriately with 
guilty and not guilty verdicts. Two were non-damaging, so 
their association with a positive evaluation is logically 
consistent. The remaining three i terns were g:enerally damaging 
to the defendant's case, and were considered important by 
individuals who rated the defendant as "bad." 
Evidence Inmortance Ratings 
Eight items of evidence were chosen from the videotapes 
to apnear on the evidence importance rating instrument. These 
items were pivotal points of evidence which favored either the 
State's case or the Defense case. Two of them involved eye-
witness testimony: the bartender's testimony and the victim's 
eyewitness identification of the defendant as his assailant. 
These two items were rated as most important, over all con-
ditions, despite the fact that in both cases there was addi-
tional evidence given which weakened the testimony. This 
situation points up the prevailing tendency of persons to 
believe eyewitnesses regardless of the witnesses' probable 
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ability to be sure of what they saw. 
Four of the eight items of evidence were presented, 
unchanged, in all evidence conditions. The following dis-
cussion will ennumerate these items as well as the ones which 
were varied. 
Physician's testimon~. This portion of the evidence was 
considered important, since the physician testified as to the 
seriousness of the victim's injuries. This testimony re-
mained constant in all evidence conditions. In terms of the 
defendant's guilt or innocence, this testimony did not 
actually present any "evidence" at all. The physician merely 
attested to the victim's injuries; he did not present evi-
dence either favoring or damaging the defendant's case. 
The perceived importance of the physician's testimony 
was inversely correlated with three other pieces of evidence; 
in general, his testimony was rated as substantially lower in 
importance than any of the others. This ranking is appro-
priate, since the testimony could not be used to determine 
either the defendant's guilt or his innocence. 
Defendant's lack of corroboration for his account of his 
own actions on the night of the crime. Although the defen-
dant had his own version of his actions on the night of the 
crime, it could not be verified by any other witnesses. This 
item of evidence was not varied across evidence condition and 
was considered mildly damaging to the defendant's case. 
Despite the fact that the jurors considered this item as 
relatively unimportant, the Level of Evidence variable did 
affect significantly the ratings in a non-linear fashion. 
65 
The general shape of the relationship is an inverted-U, with 
ratings of medium importance in the high guilt condition, 
high importance in the ambiguous condition, and low impor-
tance in the low guilt condition. Apparently, for jurors who 
faced the most ambiguous situation (i.e., those in the ambi-
guous evidence condition), this item functioned to anchor 
their discussion/decision. 
Absence of stains on the defendant's clothes when 
arrested. When the defendant was arrested, no blood stains 
appeared on his clothing--clothing which he apparently had 
been wearing the night before when the crime was committed. 
This item remained constant across all tapes. Since it was 
favorable to the defendant, it was considered to be 
non-damaging. 
As apparent guilt increased, the perceived importance of 
this item decreased. In the high guilt condition, other, 
more specific and damaging items were available to consider. 
In the low guilt condition, this item was one of the few un-
ambiguous items of evidence and was considered, therefore, 
more important. 
Defendant's account of his ~ activities Q!l the night 
of the crime. This is the final item held constant across 
evidence conditions. Because the defendant denied having 
committed the crime and presented an account of his own 
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activities which precluded his guilt, this item was consi-
dered non-damaging. Importance ratings for this item were 
not systematically influenced by either independent variable, 
nor by the interaction. It was correlated significantly, 
however, with verdict. Jurors voting guilty rated this item 
as unimportant; those who voted not guilty rated it as impor-
tant. These judgments of importance seem very consistent 
with the decisions made. 
Amount of alcohol consumed :Qy the victim and defendant. 
This factor is the first of four which were varied across 
evidence condition in order to increase or decrease the appar-
ent guilt of the defendant. In the high guilt condition, the 
alcohol consumption was low, implying that the defendant had 
the motor coordination to commit the crime and lending more 
credibility to the victim's eyewitness identification of the 
defendant as his assailant. Since alcohol consumption in the 
low guilt condition was rather high, it casted doubt on the 
defendant's ability to have committed the crime and on the 
victim's identification of him as the perpetrator of the 
crime. 
The perceived importance of this item was unrelated to 
either of the independent variables. The audio tapes indi-
cated that many of the jurors had difficulty in deciding how 
much alcohol was necessary to produce intoxication, and how 
• intoxicated a person could be without adversely affecting his 
own physical and mental capabilities. Although jurors relied 
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on personal experiences, these experiences often were in dis-
agreement. This situation may have produced a feeling of un-
certainty about this item, which might account for the lack 
of systematic influence by the independent variables. 
Alcohol consumption was correlated significantly with 
verdict. Jurors who voted guilty perceived this item as 
unimportant; those who voted not guilty perceived it as impor-
tant. This relationship indicates that low alcohol consump• 
tion (in the high guilt condition, where most of the guilty 
verdicts occurred) was not viewed as important (i.e. , was per-
ceived as not necessarily indicative of the defendant's guilt); 
high alcohol consumption, on the other hand, was perceived as 
more important evidence in favoring the defendant's innocence. 
Amount of rnonev found .QD. defendant when arrested. When 
he was arrested, the amount of money the defendant had in his 
possession was varied across evidence conditions, ranging 
from $70 in the high guilt condition to $7 in the low guilt 
condition. This factor was damaging in the high guilt condi-
tion, especially since the defendant's only income was $55 
per week from unemployment compensation. In addition, in the 
high guilt condition, he was unable to explain his acquisition 
of this large sum. 
The perceived importance of this item was influenced 
significantly by evidence condition. As apparent guilt in-
creased, the perceived importance of this item increased. 
This relationship is understandable since in the high guilt 
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condition this item is probably one of the two most damaging 
factors. Jurors viewing the low apparent guilt trial tended 
to perceive this item as relatively unimportant. The $7 sum 
was judged as less important than some other items of evi-
dence in this condition. 
Bartender's testimony. The bartender's testimony changed 
across evidence conditions. In both the high guilt and the 
ambiguous conditions, he testified that he saw the defendant 
follow the victim out of the bar on the night of the crime. 
His expressed certainty regarding what he saw was varied, how-
. 
ever. In the high guilt condition, the bartender testified 
that he knew the men because they had frequented the bar pre-
viously, and that he was absolutely certain that he saw the 
defendant go out the door immediately behind the victim. In 
the ambiguous version, he testified that he had not seen them 
before, but that he had seen them leave together, the defen-
dant walking a few paces behind the defendant. Under cross-
examination by the defense attorney in this condition, the 
bartender admitted that he did not remember seeing them 
actually going out the door together. In the low guilt con-
dition, his testimony indicated that he had seen the defendant 
in the bar several minutes after the victim had left. 
The perceived importance of this item was significantly 
affected by evidence condition. The relationship is U-shaped. 
Importance ratings were extremely high in the low guilt condi-
tion, less in the high guilt version, and least in the 
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ambiguous condition. Since the bartender was the only real 
witness other than the defendant and victim, his report of 
having seen the defendant in the bar after the victim had 
left was perceived as crucial. In the high guilt condition, 
he was certain of what he saw but the jurors had other 
damaging items of evidence to consider in deciding the def-
endant's guilt or innocence; therefore, this item was seen 
as less crucial in their decision. Finally, in the ambiguous 
condition, the bartender's testimony was truly ambiguous, and 
therefore was not considered important. It should be noted 
that, despite the fact that jurors rated this item signifi-
cantly less important in the ambiguous condition, it was 
rated as the most important item, overall. 
Victim's claim of seeing the defendant's face during the 
attack. Although the content of the victim's testimony re-
mained constant, his expressed certainty varied. In the high 
guilt condition, the victim identified the defendant as his 
assailant, and the defense attorney was unable to cast doubt 
on his veracity or his ability to identify the defendant. In 
the low guilt condit.ion, however, he was forced to admit, 
under cross-examination, that conditions existed which made 
an accurate identification very unlikely. 
Level of Evidence influenced significantly the perceived 
importance of this item. Jurors in the high apparent guilt 
condition rated it as more important than jurors in the low 
guilt condition. The victim's eyewitness testimony, and his 
certainty about that testimony, were very damaging in the 
high guilt trial and, therefore, very important. 
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In the low guilt condition, although uncertain, the 
victim maintained that it was the defendant who had attacked 
and robbed him. Other evidence in that condition, notably 
the bartender's testimony and the absence of blood stains on 
the defendant's clothing, favored the defendant more power-
fully. The jurors rated those items as more important, there-
fore, and the victim's testimony as less important. 
The Alternates 
To some extent, close comparison can be made between the 
behavior of the alternates and that of the jurors who had 
benefit of deliberation. The verdicts of both alternates and 
jurors were affected by Level of Evidence, those of the alter-
nates achieving a higher significance level than those of the 
jurorso Importance ratings of two items of evidence were 
similarly influenced by Level of Evidence; both the barten-
der's testimony and the victim's identification of the defen-
dant as his assailant involved eyewitness testimony, attesting 
to the tendency of persons to give emphasis to such testimony. 
Differences between the jurors and alternates become 
apparent in examining the ma.iority of remaining evidence 
items. Overall, both Leve~ of Evidence and Type of Trial af-
fected the responses of jurors much more significantly than 
they did the responses of alternates. Apparently, group deli-
beration was responsible for this disparity, since in all 
other respects the alternates were treated the same as the 
jurors. It appears that deliberation served to clarify the 
relationship among the items of evidence, resulting in the 
greater effects noted. Jurors emphasized various items, 
which differed depending upon the trial they had seen. The 
discussion tended to result in perceptions which were closer 
in agreement among the jurors in each condition. Since 
a~ternates did not deliberate, they did not have benefit of 
this reciprocal process of clarification. 
Conclusion 
Most juries considered the evidence relatively well, 
attempting to analyze the probability of each witness's vera-
city and ~redibility. In considering the testimony, they 
examined not only the possibility of deliberate deceit, but 
also whether the witness under scrutiny might have been mis-
taken; despite this careful consideration, however, they still 
tended to see the eyewitness testimony as most important. 
The judge's instruction was a crucial element in many of 
the jury deliberations. Overall, the jurors obeyed the 
"reasonable doubt" standard and the instructions regarding 
the appropriate use of the prior criminal record. The jurors 
reminded each other of these points when transgressions of 
the instructions seemed imminent. The evidence in the high 
guilt condition did indicate that the defendant was guilty; 
this was substantiated by the independent raters who judged 
the tape without the judge's instructions and prior record. 
Only five of the 12 juries in this condition, however, returned 
a verdict of guilty. Although the relationship between evi-
dence condition and verdict achieved significance, less than 
half of the juries in the high apparent guilt condition found 
the defendant guilty. The principle of reasonable doubt and 
presumption of innocence, as defined in the judge's instruc-
tions, probably had a significant impact. 
The presence of the defendant's prior criminal record 
did not significantly affect the verdict. One possible reason 
for this result is, again, the judge's instructions. Two 
additional factors, however, may have had an important role: 
first, the severity of both the present crime and the crime 
involved in the previous conviction: and second, the relevance, 
or similarity, of the previous crime to the current one. Both 
possibilities should be explored in further research. 
Both high apparent guilt and presence of the prior record 
were significantly associated with longer deliberation time 
for verdict. In both cases, greater ambiguity resulted from 
these conditions, which forced the jurors to deliberate longer 
regarding the defendant's guilt or innocence. 
Finally, the jurors' individual ratings on the abbrevia-
ted semantic differential and the evidence importance instru-
ment demonstrated consistency. In general, those in the high 
guilt condition, or who were in the one-stage trial .condition 
saw the defendant as "weak" and "bad." Those in the low guilt 
condition or who had participated in the bifurcated proceeding 
rated him as "strong" and "good." Jurors in the high guilt 
condition or who had voted guilty tended to rate damaging 
evidence as important; while those in the low guilt condition 
or who had voted not guilty tended to perceive non-damaging 
evidence as most importan~. Thus, they integrated the infor-
mation in the tapes in a consistent manner. Their responses 
on the semantic differential and their evidence importance 
ratings demonstrate this consistency. 
REFERENCE NOTES 
(1) Baker, w. Personal eommunication, April lJ, 1978. 
(2) Wall, R. L. Personal communication, March 9, 19?8. 
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APPENDIX A 
TRIAL SCRIPT: AMBIGUOUS 
EVIDENCE CONDITION 
Inf orrna t ion 
The State of Oklahoma versus Neal Garnett, Defendant. 
Charles H. Headrick, District Attorney of Payne County, 
State of Oklahoma, under and virtue of the authority vested 
in him as District Attorney, gives this Honorable Court to 
know and be informed in the name and by the authority of the 
State of Oklahoma, that in the County of Payne and State of 
Oklahoma, on the twelfth day of November, 1975, Neal Garnett, 
while acting alone, did commit the crime of Robbery by Force 
in the following form and fashion, to-wit: that is to say 
that the said defendant, Neal Garnett, while acting alone, 
then and there being, did willfully, wrongfully, unlawfully, 
and feloniously rob one James Lawrence, by wrongfully taking 
and carrying away certain money and personal property of 
value belonging to and in the possession of said James 
Lawrence, and in his immediate presence, without his consent 
and against his will, said robbery being accomplished by said 
defendant, while acting alone, by means of force and violence 
used against said James Lawrence by then and there kicking 
him and knocking him down onto the ground, beating and kick-
ing him about the head and body and then and there wrongfully 
taking and carrying the money and property aforesaid, in 
Violation of Title 21, Oklahoma State Statutes, Section 791, 
contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and 
provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of 
Oklahoma. 
Introductory Remarks 
JUDGE1 Let the record show that the defendant is personally 
present in the courtroom with his court-appointed 
attorney, Mr. Jackson. Is the State ready? 
PROSECUTOR1 State's ready, Your Honor. 
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JUDGE1 Is the Defense ready? 
JACKSONs Yes, Your Honor. 
JUDGE: Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, this is the case 
of the State of Oklahoma versus Neal Garnett. The 
charge is Robbery by Force. At this stage of the pro-
ceeding, the State will tell the plea of the defendant 
and make an opening statement, outlining in some detail· 
the evidence and witnesses to be called to prove their 
case today. Mr. Prosecutor ••• ? 
PROSECUTOR: Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, to this 
charge the defendant has entered a plea of not guilty. 
This is our whole reason for being here. At this point, 
I want to explain briefly to you what the evidence of 
the State will be. This case does not involve many 
people--we will call only four witnesses. First of all, 
the complaining witness, James Lawrence, is the man who 
was with the defendant for a short time during the 
evening of the twelfth of November 1975· I anticipate 
that the evidence will show that Mr. Lawrence was in a 
bar in Cushing on that evening, and while at the bar he 
met the defendant and they had some drinks together. I 
further anticipate his testimony to indicate that, upon 
deciding to leave this establishment to go home, he was 
followed by the defendant, and that when he got outside 
the bar, he was hit from behind and knocked down. He 
was then beaten and kicked by the defendant. and was 
finally robbed of some personal property. His testimony 
will further indicate that, after this beating took 
place, he met one of the other witnesses at another near-
by bar and that this other witness took him to the hospi-
tal. Both Mr. Lawrence and the other witness will be 
able to tell you of Mr. Lawrence's condition when they 
met after Mr. Lawrence had been attacked. 
As to the witness Jack Simpson--! believe that his 
testimony will show that he is a bartender in Cushing 
and that he personally saw the defendant, Neal Garnett, 
follow Jim Lawrence out of the bar when Mr. Lawrence 
left that night. 
Our final witness will be Dr. Taylor, who was the 
physician on duty in the emergency room at the hospital 
where the victim was taken for treatment of his injuries. 
This witness will testify as to the extent of James 
Lawrence's injuries and the medical treatment that was 
required. 
Now, I anticipate that the State will not call any 
other witnesses, and after we present this case to you, 
and the defense has done so. too, you will reach a ver-
dict that will find this defendant guilty as charged. 
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JUDGE1 At this stage of the case, Ladies and Gentlemen of 
the Jury, the defendant has an opportunity to make an 
opening statement or to reserve this opening statement 
until a later stage of the proceeding. I now inquire, 
does the defendant wish to make an opening statement 
or reserve? 
JACKSON1 The defendant will reserve, Your Honor. 
JUDGEs Fine, then, call your first witness for the State. 
Testimony of Victim 
PROSECUTOR: Q. State your name, please. 
A. James Lawrence. 
Q. How old are you? 
A. Twenty. 
Q. And where do you live at the present time? 
A. In Cushing. 
Q. Are you employed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What do you do? 
A. I'm a clerk at a store in Cushing. 
Q. Directing your attention to the evening of the twelfth 
of November, 1975, did you have occasion to be at the 
B. & L. Club in Cushing, Oklahoma, on that evening? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What were you doing there? 
A. I was having a few beers and playing pool. 
Q. What time did you get there? 
A. Must've been about ?:JO. 
Q. What happened when you got there? 
A. Like I said, I ordered a beer and sat for awhile, then 
got another beer and started playing pool. 
Q. Who were you playing pool with? 
A. I was playing pool with Neal Garnett, and we had some 
beers together. 
Q. Had you known the defendant, Neal Garnett, before this 
evening at the B. & L. Club? 
A. No, I had never met him. 
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Q. You said a moment ago that you and Mr. Garnett had some 
drinks together. Who paid for these drinks? 
A. I did. 
Q. Did you pay for all of them? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was· there any particular reason why you were paying for 
all the drinks? 
A. Yes. In talking with Neal Garnett, I found out that he 
was unemployed and hadn't worked for over two months. 
Since I had some money, and he didn't, I bought the beer 
for both of us. 
Q. How many drinks would you say you bought? 
A. I'd say about four or five rounds, at least. 
Q. Was the defendant present when you paid for them? 
A. Oh, yes. 
Q. Would you say, then, that the defendant had the opportunity 
to see that you had money with you? 
A. I suppose so, yes. 
Q. What time did you leave the B. & L. Club that night? 
A. Around 10130 or 11100. 
Q. Why did you leave the club? 
A. It was getting late, and I had to get up early the next 
morning and go to work. 
Q. Now, Mr. Lawrence, what happened when you decided to leave 
the bar? 
A. I told Neal that I was going to have to leave because of 
having to get up early the next morning. I got up to 
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leave, and as I was walking out the door, I noticed that 
he was right behind me. 
Q. Did you think that was strange? 
A. Sort of, at first. Then I thought he must want a ride 
home. 
Q. Did you have a car or any form of transportation with 
you? 
A. Yes, I did. I had brought my pickup truck with me, and 
I had gotten the keys out of my pocket as I was leaving 
the bar. 
Q. What happened after you noticed that the defendant was 
following you outside? 
A. As soon as I got out the door, I started to turn around 
to ask him if he wanted me to take him home. Just as I 
began to turn around, I was hit on the head from behind. 
Q. Do you know what you were hit with? 
A. No, I don't, but it knocked me down to the ground, and I 
was--I guess I was sort of dazed for a minute. The next 
thing I knew, I looked up and saw Neal Garnett's face and 
then he kicked me in the face. 
Q. You looked up and saw his face? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You're sure that the person you saw was Neal Garnett, the 
defendant in this case? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What happened after you were kicked in the face? 
A. I remember being hit again and again, and being kicked 
some more, in the stomach and on the back. Then I felt 
my wallet being pulled out of my pocket. 
Q. And then? 
A. Then the hitting and kicking stopped for a minute, and I 
tried to get up. 
Q. Were you able to get to your feet? 
A. After a few seconds, I was. 
Q. Then what did you do? 
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A. I got up and tried to run away. Once I got away from 
him, I tried to get as far away as I could. I ran some, 
then walked, then ran again. 
Q. Why did you run away, Mr. Lawrence? 
A. I was afraid he'd kill me. 
Q. You believed that you might be killed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did you do once you had run away? 
A. After I had gone a little way, I figured that I was safe. 
Then I thought about what to do. 
Q. And what did you decide to do? 
A. I decided that the best thing I could do would be to keep 
walking and see if I could get some help from someone. 
Q. Did you find someone to help you? 
A. Yes. I was walking along and came to another bar, 
Dorothy's Place, and saw someone standing out front, so I 
started running again, as best I could. 
Q. Did you know the person who was standing in front of this 
second bar? 
A. Yes. It was Bob Farrell, a man I had met through my 
sister a few months before. 
Q. What happened after you saw Mr. Farrell? 
A. I walked toward him. He recognized me and asked what in 
the world had happened. I told him I had been beaten and 
I needed help. 
Q. Were you in pain at this point, Mr. Lawrence? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Great pain? 
A. Yes. I could hardly stay on my feet. 
Q. What did Mr. Farrell do? 
A. He helped me get over to his car, and then he took me to 
the hospital. 
Q. Were you seen by a physician at this hospital? 
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A. Yes. I believe his name was Dr. Taylor. He was in the 
emergency room when I got there. 
Q. How long did you stay at the hospital? 
A. Well, they kept me for five days. Something about--they 
said I might have internal injuries. So they kept me. 
Q. Now, Mr. Lawrence, how much money would you say was in 
your wallet that night, when you decided to go home? 
A. I'd say probably about $80 - $85. 
Q. How do you come up with that figure? 
A. Because I know how much I started out with, and how much 
r··spent that night. 
Q. Alright, now did you give anyone permission to remove 
your wallet that night? 
A. No sir, I didn't. 
Q. And you are absolutely sure that it was Neal Garnett's 
face you saw right before being kicked in the face? 
A. Yes. 
PROSECUTOR1 Your witness. 
JACKSONa Q. Mr. Lawrence, you testified that you were drink-
ing both before you met Mr. Garnett that night and you 
were drinking while the two of you were playing pool. Is 
that right? 
A. Yes, I was drinking beer. 
Q. And how many beers would you say you had during the course 
o.f the evening? 
A. About five or six, I think. 
Q. Enough to get you high? 
A. Yes, I suppose so. 
Q, Enough to make you drunk? 
A. No sir. I was not drunk. 
Q. You also testified that you paid for the drinks because 
the defendant didn't have any money. Did he tell you he 
didn't have any money? 
85 
A. No, I just figured he didn't, since he told me he hadn't 
worked for awhile. 
Q, Alright, now, where did you say you were when you were 
hit the first time? 
A. Outside the bar--just outside the door. 
Q. You also said you were dazed for a moment after you were 
hit the first time. Is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you have any idea what could have gone on while you 
were dazed at this time? 
A. No sir, I don't. 
Q. Do you have any idea how long you were dazed? 
A. I can't say exactly, but it couldn't have been long. 
Q. And you're absolutely sure that it was Neal Garnett who 
kicked you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Lawrence, you testified that you had never met 
Mr. Garnett before that evening. Is that right? 
A. Yes, it is." 
Q. Tell me, while you and he were playing pool together, did 
you talk much? 
A. I don't know ••• We talked some. We were playing pool, 
so I guess we didn't talk constantly. 
Q. How much time did you actually spend talking to him and 
looking at his face? You were concentrating on the game, 
weren't you? 
A. Yes, I was paying attention to the game, but I saw him 
well enough to recognize him outside the bar. 
Q. OK. Now, when you left the bar, or rather when you 
started toward the door, you noticed the defendant walking 
behind you, is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Tell me, did he speak to you as you were walking toward 
the door? 
-----
86 
A. No, he didn't. 
Q. Did you say anything to him at that point? 
A. No. 
Q. I see. Now, Mr. Lawrence, you said that you noticed him 
walking behind you toward the door, then when you got 
outside, you were hit on the head from behind and were 
knocked to the ground. Is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you said that you were dazed for a moment and then 
you saw Neal Garnett's face just before he kicked you? 
A. Yes, that's right. 
Q. Mr. Lawrence, would you say that there was very much 
light there, outside the bar, at lOrJO at night? 
A. Well, it was kind of dark, but there is a streetlight 
near there, and there is a light at the entrance to the 
bar. There was enough light to see. 
Q. Where is the light at the entrance to the bar located? 
A. There's a light bulb on each side of the door. 
Q. So anyone who is standing on the sidewalk in front of the 
bar, with his back to the door, would have his face--his 
face would be in shadow, .isn't that right? 
A. Well--yes, I guess so. 
Q. Yet you are saying, Mr. Lawrence, that you were able to 
recognize Mr. Garnett, with no doubt, after you had talked 
with him a little, not paying much attention, and after 
being hit and knocked to the ground and dazed. You are 
able to identify him after all that happened, and while 
looking up from the ground, where you had landed after 
being hit, and while your attacker was standing there with 
his face in shadow. Is that correct? 
A. I know what I saw. Yes, all that is right. 
Q, You don't think you might possibly be mistaken in your 
identification of Neal Garnett as the person who hit you? 
A. No. 
Q. Mr. Lawrence, moving along, how is it that, after being 
kicked and hit repeatedly, you were able to get away from 
your assailant so easily? 
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A. I don't know. I guess, after he took my wallet out of 
my pocket, he was looking through it or something. 
Maybe he thought I was out and wasn't paying attention, 
Q. Alright, when you got away, why didn't you get in your 
pickup and drive away, instead of walking? 
A. I was running away--! just wanted to get away from there 
as fast as I could. Besides, I guess my keys were 
knocked out of my hand when I was attacked. I had them 
in my hand when I went through the door on my way out-
side, but when I got up to try to get away, I di:dn't 
have them. 
Q. Alright. Then what did you do, after you got up and 
started running? 
A. I ran down the street until I saw someone who I thought 
could help me. 
Q. And this was Mr. Farrell? 
A. Yes. 
Q, How far is it from the B. & L. Club to Dorothy's Place? 
A. About five or six blocks, I think. 
Q. And how long would you say it took you to get from the 
B. & L. Club to Dorothy's Place? 
A. I don't know. I guess it must have taken about 15 or 20 
minutes. 
Q, Mr. Lawrence, were you drunk that night? 
A. No sir. 
JACKSON: I have no further questions. 
JUDGE1 Any further questions for the State? 
PROSECUTORs No, Your Honor. 
JUDGE1 You may step down. Next witness. 
Testimony Qf Robert Farrell 
PROSECUTOR1 Q. State your name, please. 
A. Robert Farrell. 
Q. How old are you, Mr. Farrell? 
A. Thirty years old. 
Q. What is your occuoation? 
A. I own a service station in Cushing. 
Q. Do you know James Lawrence? 
A. Yes. I do. 
Q. How long have you known hi~? 
A. I first met him last June. I had known his sister 
before then, and I met him at her house. 
Q. Mr. Farrell, where were you on the evening of 
November 12, 1975? 
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A. I spent most of the evenin~ at a bar in Cushing called 
Dorothy's Place. 
Q. And did you see .James Lawrence during that evening? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Please tell the court the circumstances under which you 
saw James Lawrence on that evening. 
A. I had been at this bar since about 9100. I decided to 
leave about 11130 and I went outside and all of a sudden 
I saw Jim walking toward me. 
Q. What kind of condition was he in? 
A. He was all bloody--his head and face had blood all over 
them, and he was kind of staggering. 
Q. What did you do? 
A. I ran up to him and asked what happened. 
Q. Then what? 
A. He told me what happened and I took him to the hospital. 
Q. In your opinion. Mr. Farrell, after seeing him and talking 
with him, what would you say his condition was? 
A. He couldn't hardly walk. I could see he was in pain. I 
had to help him get to my car so I could get help for him. 
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Q. So when you saw him, it was obvious to you that he had 
been hurt--he had blood on him? 
A. Yes sir. 
PROSECUTOR: Your witness. 
JACKSONs I have no questions, Your Honor. 
JUDGEs Witness is excused. Next witness. 
Testimony of ~· Simpson 
PROSECUTOR1 Q. State your name, occupation, and place of 
employment, please. 
A. Jack Simpson. I'm a bartender at the B. & L. Club. 
Q. Were you working at the B. & L. Club on the evening of 
November 12, 1975? 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. And did you see James Lawrence and Neal Garnett there 
that evening? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Were the two of them together that night? 
A. Yes, they were there drinking together and playing pool. 
Q. You said they were drinking together. Did you personally 
serve these drinks to them? 
A. Yes sir, I sure did. 
Q. Did you notice when Jim Lawrence left the B. & L.? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. When Mr. Lawrence left, did you notice anyone walking 
behind him? 
A. Yes.' Neal Garnett got up right after he did, and I saw 
him walking behind him. 
Q. And after Mr. Lawrence left, was that the last time you 
saw him that night? 
A. Yes sir. 
PROSECUTOR: Thank you, Mr. Simpson. Your witness. 
JACKSON1 Q. Mr. Simpson, how busy were you that night? 
A. What do you mean? 
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Q. How many people were in the B. & L. Club? Did you stay 
busy serving drinks? 
A. Yes, I stayed pretty busy. It was about like any other 
night, I guess. 
Q. So even though you were busy, you still noticed when each 
of these men arrived and what they did and when they left? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you actually see Jim Lawrence and Neal Garnett go 
through the door? Think carefully now. 
A. Well--! don't remember seeing them go through the door. 
I mean, I saw them start to leave, and I saw them walking 
toward the door, but I can't say that I remember actually 
seeing them open the door and go outside. 
Q. So of your own personal knowledge, you can't say for sure 
that Neal Garnett actually followed Jim Lawrence all the 
way out the door? 
A. No sir, I guess I can't. 
Q. Tell me, Mr. Simpson, did you know these two men before 
that night at the B. & L.? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. You had never seen them before in the Club? 
A. I don't think so. I guess they could have been there 
before that night, but I don't think I noticed them 
before that night. 
Q. Why did you notice them that particular night? I mean--
did either of them do anything unusual that night,- to 
make you remember them? 
A. I don't think so. I just noticed them playing pool 
together. 
Q, Alright, now, considering the fact that you were pretty 
busy that night, and considering the fact that you didn't 
know either of the~ how sure are you that you actually 
saw these two men leave together? 
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A. I remember seeing them together, but I guess I can't be 
sure they left together. 
Q. And you stated before that you didn't actually see them 
go out the door together? 
A. Yes, that's right. I can't say that they actually left 
the club together. 
JACKSONs Thank you. No further questions, Your Honor. 
JUDGE1 Any re-direct? 
PROSECUTORs No, Your Honor. 
JUDGE: You may step down. Next witness. 
·Testimony of Dr. Hugh Taylor 
PROSECUTORa Q. Your name please? 
A. I am Dr. Hugh Taylor. 
Q. What do you do, sir? 
A. I am a physician and surgeon. 
Q. And where do you practice? 
A. Drumright, Oklahoma. 
Q, How long have you been practicing there, Dr. Taylor? 
A. Since 1969. 
PROSECUTORa I wonder if the defense· attorney would be willing 
to stipulate to the doctor's qualifications? 
JACKSON1 So stipulated. 
JUDGE1 Very well, 
PROSECUTORs Q. Dr. Taylor, I'd ask you, in the early morning 
hours of the thirteenth of November, 1975, did you have 
occasion to make an examination of one James Lawrence? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And where did this examination take place? 
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A. In the emergency room at the hospital in Drumright. 
Q. What did you observe about the physical condition of 
James Lawrence? 
A. The examination revealed bruises about the face, neck, 
chest, the lower back, the abdomen, both arms and legs, 
and over the left ear. There was blood draining from 
the nose and left ear. The eyes were swollen and bruised. 
The left eardrum was ruptured, the nose was fractured, 
and there was marked tenderness over the abdomen. 
Q. Now Doctor, do you have an opinion as to whether these 
injuries had been recently incurred by Mr. Lawrence? 
A. Yes. The blood was fresh. 
Q. And did you prescribe any further treatment for him? 
A. Yes. We admitted him to the hospital because of the 
abdominal findings. The examination I performed indi-
cated the possibility of inter-abdominal injury, so we 
put him to bed there in the hospital, so that we could 
mo.ni tor his condition. 
Q. Did you later come to any conclusion regarding the 
possibility of these further injuries? 
A. Yes. We monitored his blood count closely and watched 
his progress. There was no indication of internal 
bleeding, so I transferred his ease. 
PROSECUTORs Your witness. 
JACKSON: I have no questions. 
JUDGE1 Witness is excused. Call your next. 
PROSECUTORs If it please the court, the State rests. 
JUDGEs Is the defense ready to proceed? 
JACKSONt Yes, Your Honor. 
JUDGEt Do you have an opening statement? 
JACKSON: Yes, Your Honor, we do. 
JUDGEs Fine, then, you may proceed. 
JACKSONt Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, I'd like to, if 
I could, briefly state what evidence we have to present 
at this time. We are not questioning the fact that 
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Mr. Lawrence was beaten and robbed. The issue in this 
case is whether or not the defendant, Neal Garnett, was 
responsible for the beating and robbery. 
The basic thrust of the evidence starts the same as 
the evidence you've already heard from the State. How-
ever, I believe that the evidence will show that from the 
time Jim Lawrence left the B. & L. Club that night, the 
story is somewhat different. We have only one witness 
to call for the defense--the defendant himself. After 
hearing his testimony, I believe that you will find for 
the defendant in this case, that is, that you will 
return a verdict of not guilty. Thank you. 
JUDGEs Call your first witness. 
Testimony of Neal Garnett 
JACKSON: Q. State your name and age, please. 
A. My name is Neal Garnett, and I am 24 years old. 
Q. Now, Mr. Garnett, please tell us where you were in the 
early evening hours of November 12. 1975. 
A. I was at the B. & L. Club in Cushing. 
Q. Did you go there alone? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Did you at any time that evening talk with anyone else? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Please tell us the circumstances surrounding that 
conversation. 
A. Well, I got there about 7:45 or 8100 and bought a beer 
and started playing pool. Then I saw Jim Lawrence and we 
started talking and we played a couple of games of pool. 
Q. Did you drink together? 
A. Yes, we were drinking while we talked. 
Q. And who paid for these drinks? 
A. Well, Jim Lawrence paid for them. 
Q. Why did Mr. Lawrence pay for them? 
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A. He offered to, and so I thought that I would let him buy 
the first few, and then I'd buy a few later in the 
evening. 
Q. And did you buy a few later in the evening? 
A. No. I was going to, but then all of a sudden he said 
he had to leave, so I didn't. 
Q. Alright, Mr. Garnett. Now, what happened when 
Mr. Lawrence decided to leave? 
A. I said OK, and he got up and left. 
Q. What did you do? 
A. I went to the restroom. Then when I came out of the 
restroom, I finished the beer I had and then left. 
Q. How long would you say it was between the time 
Mr. Lawrence left and the time you left? 
A. Oh, probably at least 20 minutes or so. 
Q. What did you do when you left? 
A. I went to another club. 
Q. And what is the name of this other club? 
A. It's right near the B. & L. The name of it is the Hot 
Spot, I think. 
Q. Now, Mr. Garnett, after Jim Lawrence left the B. & L. 
that night, did you see him again? 
A. No, I didn't see him any more that night. 
Q. What time did you leave this second bar? 
A. About llsJO. 
Q. What did you do then? 
A. I went home. 
Q. How did you happen to be arrested? I mean, where were 
you when you were arrested? 
A. It was later that night. or rather early the next morning. 
The police came to my house and arrested me. 
Q. Mr. Garnett, did you attack Jim Lawrence on the night of 
November 12, 1975? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Did you hit him or kick him? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you remove any personal property from Mr. Lawrence 
on that night? 
A. No. 
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Q. And is this testimony that you've given true to the best 
of your recollection? 
A. Yes. 
JACKSON: Your witness. 
PROSECUTOR: Q. Mr. Garnett, where are you employed? 
A. I don't have a job right now. 
Q. Do you have any income? 
A. Yes, I get unemployment checks. 
Q. How much do these checks come to? 
A. $55 a week. 
Q. What is your occupation--what did you do when you were 
employed? 
A. I was a car mechanic. 
Q. Were you unemployed on November 12 of last year? 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. And your only income then was unemployment checks? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, Mr. Garnett, you stated that when James Lawrence 
left the B~ & L. Club on the evening of November 12 last, 
that you did not follow him out but instead stayed in the 
B. & L. for awhile longer, is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you also testified that when you did leave, you went 
to another bar and stayed until about ll:JO. Is that 
right? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Tell me, Mr. Garnett, did you see anyone you knew at this 
second bar? 
A. No, that's why I didn't stay very long. 
Q. Did you buy any drinks at this second bar? 
A. Yes, one. 
Q. Do you, remember, or could you identify, the bartender at 
that second club? 
A. No. It was a woman, but I didn't know her. 
Q. Could that bartender--do you think she would remember you? 
A. No. I just bought one drink, and the place was pretty 
crowded that night. She was busy. 
Q. Alright, so you say you went to this second bar, but saw 
no one you know and no one who would remember seeing you 
there? 
A. That's right. But I was there. 
Q. OK, Mr. Garnett. You said that when you left the second 
place, you went home? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Tell me, would you say you were drunk that night? 
A. Not drunk. Pretty high, but not drunk. 
Q, Are you married? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you live with anyone? 
A. No, I live alone. 
Q. And when you got home that night, you went right to bed? 
A. Yes. 
Q, And the police came and arrested you at your home? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What were you wearing when you were arrested? 
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A. I had not changed clothes to go to bed, so I was wearing 
the same thing I had worn the night before. 
Q. You were wearing the same things you had worn on the 
night of November 12? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was the condition of those clothes? 
A. What do you mean? 
Q. Well, were they clean or dirty, or wrinkled, or what? 
A. I guess you could say they were dirty and wrinkled. I'd 
worn them since the afternoon before, and I'd slept in 
them. 
Q. Were there any stains on them? 
A. No. 
Q. Tell me, did you have any money in your wallet or in your 
pockets when you were arrested? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. How much? 
A. A little over $70. 
Q. Since you're unemployed, and your only income, you have 
testified, is $55 a week from the unemployment commission, 
how did you happen to have over $70 on you when you were 
arrested? 
A. I had saved it up to pay rent with. 
Q, I see. Now, Mr, Garnett, to sum up, you say that when you 
left the B. & L. Club, it was after Jim Lawrence had left, 
and you went to another bar, where you stayed for a little 
while, and then went home. Is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You heard the testimony given by Mr. Lawrence, didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you testified that you did not see Mr. Lawrence again, 
after he left the B. & L. that night? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Your story is quite different from the story Jim Lawrence 
told, isn't it? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. You are saying then that his story is untrue? 
A. I am saying that he was mistaken. 
Q. But you are saying that his story is untrue? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Somebody's not telling the truth. 
A. That's right. 
PROSECUTOR: No further questions. 
JUDGEs Do you have any re-direct, Mr. Jackson? 
JACKSON: No, Your Honor. 
JUDGEs Alright, witness is excused. Call your next. 
JACKSONs Your Honor, we have no further witnesses. The 
defense rests. 
Judge's Instructions 
Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury1 
The Defendant in this case is charged with having com-
mitted the offense of Robbery by Force in this county on or 
about the twelfth day of November, 1975, as set forth in the 
Information which has been read to you. 
To this charge the defendant has entered a plea of not 
guilty, which casts upon the State the burden of proving the 
material allegations of the Information to your satisfaction 
beyond a reasonable doubt before you would be justified in 
returning a verdict of guilty. 
The Information is simply the charge upon which the 
defendant is placed upon trial, and sets forth in a formal 
way the offense of which the defendant is accused, and it is 
in and of itself no evidence of the defendant's guilt, and 
you should not allow yourselves to be influenced against the 
defendant by reason of the filing of such an Information. 
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The defendant is presumed to be innocent of the crime 
charged against him, and innocent of each and every material 
element constituting such offense, and this presumption of 
innocence continues until such time as his guilt is shown to 
your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt. And if, upon a 
consideration of all the evidence, facts and circumstances of 
the case, you entertain a reasonable doubt of the guilt of 
the defendant of the crime charged against him, you must give 
him the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict of not 
guilty. 
The material allegations of the Information ares 
(1) That the defendant, Neal Garnett, while acting 
alone; 
(2) Did willfully, unlawfully, intentionally, and 
feloniously; 
(3) Make an assault upon James Lawrence by kicking him 
about the head and body and knocking him down onto the 
ground; 
(4) Did wrongfully take and carry away from the person 
of James Lawrence money and personal property of value belong-
ing to him as reflected by the evidencer 
(5) That said taking was against his will and was accom-
plished by means of force and violences and 
(6) That the acts aforesaid occurred in Payne County, 
Oklahoma, on or about the twelfth day of November, 1975· 
The Statutes of the State provide: 
"Robbery is a wrongful taking of personal property 
in the possession of another, from his person or 
immediate presence, and against.his will, accom-
plished by means of force or fear.ff 
"To constitute robbery, the force or fear must be 
employed either to obtain or retain possession of 
the property, 'Or to prevent or overcome resistance 
to the takingo If employed merely as a means of 
escape, it does not constitute robbery." 
"When force is employed in either of the \'lays just 
above specified, the degree of force employed is 
immaterial." 
"When property is taken under the circumstances 
required to constitute robbery, the fact that the 
property was of trifling value does not qualify 
the offense." 
"Robbery, when accomplished by the use of force, 
or of putting the person robbed in fear of some 
immediate injury to his person, is robbery in the 
first degree. When accomplished in any other 
manner, it is robbery in the second degree." 
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Should you find from the evidence, under these instruc-
tions, and beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant, 
Neal Garnett, is guilty of Robbery by Force, as charged in 
the Information, and as defined in these instructions, then 
you shall find the defendant, Neal Garnett, guilty as 
charged. But, if you do not so find, or should you enter-
tain a reasonable doubt thereof, then in either of said 
latter events you shall find the defendant, Neal Garnett, 
not guilty. 
You are the judges of the facts, the weight of the evi-
dence, and the credibility Of the witnesses. In determining· 
such weight or credit you may considers the interest, if 
any, which the witness may have in the result of the trial; 
the relation of the witness to the parties; the bias or pre-judice, if any has been apparent; the candor, fairness, 
intelligence and demeanor of the witness; the ability of the 
witness to remember and relate past occurrences, means of 
observation, and opportunity of knowing the matters about 
which the witness has testified. From all the facts and 
circumstances appearing in evidence and coming to your ob-
servation during the trial, aided by the knowledge which you 
each possess in common with other persons, you will reach 
your conclusions. You should not let sympathy, sentiment, 
or prejudice enter into your deliberations, but should dis-
charge your duties as jurors impartially, conscientiously 
and faithfully under your oaths and return such verdict as 
the evidence warrants when measured by these instructions. 
When you have retired to your jury room, you will select 
one of your number as foreman and enter upon your delibera-
tions, and when you have agreed on a verdict, which must be 
unanimous, you will cause the same to be signed by your 
foreman and return it into court. · 
APPENDIX B 
PRIOR CRIMINAL RECORD 
JUDGMENT CERTIFICATE 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF PAYNE COUNiY, STATE OF CKLAHOMA 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 9 
TJIE STATE 01' OKLAHOMA, !'lointifr 
} No. 7)-10294 va. 
Neal Garnett D<"fondant 
JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE 
Now, on thio .J.2th. d.1y or .l'J: br_uaJ:Y~ 19_2_3_, the s.1mc lx·ing a judicinl day or said Cow·t, and the time 
duly 8PJ>0ink'<I for judgment ir1. the nlX>ve entitled cause, and f..'.!id cause <.."Oming on for juCgrnent.. and thr dc-h:ndhnt, 
___ _lJ_Q_~_LG?_LD..~tt · l,.eing- per:-.unally prt·.scnl in OJK'n Court wiLh his __ 
__cour..t_-,appoimci_ Attom«y. ____R"-2;'.1110n;LL_,__E_"'Ltin 
and 1-..'lvinc bN.·n lC'i;nlly chaq:;ed. with the orr('nse o! --- . ---------
. for_g"'F~------------------
and hnvinL b!'1'..·n duly infomK'Cl of the nature of the charge nud having b1._-en duly arrniE;"ned thr>rPon, Jmd having duly and 
properly entered 
___ i~JlJ~_q_qf__N__9_j; __ ~tlj,_l_i;.Y_i;o___!_h_EC__ci::_i111_~of_f_()!'!:;!'!fJ _________ _ 
as ch.i.ri::t-d in tht• Information hernin nft(.·r h:1vin~ lx·en ddy advi.<;('d o! ___ __his ___ ri~hts snd Uw efft-c~ of such :r';f·.1: 
and H .app•·.1rinc to tlw Court th.1t the ddend:int js of t.hc age of __ EigJl''t_';~n_ ______ Yt':lrs; and L"ic ddu1d3nt 
havinr, lx'<'n .<1Shed by the Court wlwther _.h.e----,--- h:ts. any k~Hl t:..'rn-'.:.c· lo shov.· why judi;m(:nt and 1-.c:ili.:n~"'C' ~hould not b··: 
p(onounc:cd Hf.<i.insl J1.~TI!._____,, and _j1_e_ F:!..1ting: 1w ~ufficit"nl c.<Ju~ why judi:;rm·nt and ~cntcncc s!1ould not l~ pro-
nouncI·d, .and 111,.l!W apJx.:.:uing: to the ('..-0urt. jt js th1;:_,jucJt:rnent of the Court th.'.lt s.:Jid df.·kmbnl is bUjlty of L11c cri.:ne of 
----------"-'?..YJ!. ':I_y_ __ _ 
a.s chari;ed in Lhc- lnfonnatian. 
IT IS FlJH'l11EH OHDERf:D, ADJUDGED AND DECHEED BY THE COUHT that the S:>erifl of p,~-ne 
County, Okblwrn;i,, t:--anspl.l:-t .!-..'1id dd<'ndant to tJn~ s.1id S:::itC' Pcn;kn:i.iry <it :!'.7cAlestn, O~:bbo:r .. '.1, :rnd ~h-"Jt tht· Dt--
p.u!ni{'nt of Curr<•ct)ons do d<"!.<1in the !--1i<l dd1::ic!:.11t nccording- fi) th:s juJ~:mi·nt, ~C':-1!L'11ce- and ordc.:-, and th.at !...1-ic· 
Cll'fk of Uiis (\•:..:n dv J1nrnt-di~u1.~Jy t'cn.ify urn.icr. ti11:-- Se.1: oi ti1C'" l~o~1n ~)-:d cH:·J1q_•: to the> ::-:.criff of P::iym· C o~:nty, O:..-
lahonkl, two copies of tJ1is judgnl('nl, ~nt<:ncr!- and orde:, one. <i[_tli? c111iie~ to r1uOlnjl.1ny L~t- body of th•.· NJ.id dP!e11d."L'1:. 
t-0 said 1><·nitenli;1ry at .l\lc-Alf>ster, ()J ... J:J1o:n.3, and lo be :Cft f!~crf'·::ith a: t}w s.ald pc:iitC'nLc:.ry, !.-.1id covy tn bC' wMr:int 
1rnd authority for the imprisonment of tJ1e !'.<lid dcfrncLL'"'li and the o!her CC'P'; to h(· v.arr::!nl and au~hnrit\· <i! s.a:d S:-iC'riff 
of T\1ynp County, Okl~ihom3., for the tr;:,r1.<;lX'!'"l.1.tiun and im;x-iS-{Jlllll<'nl of t!~e ~Jid clvft•nd.:rnt, <is hercin~fo:-c JHo-.·ide-d; 
snid last n:mu.'d copy to be returnr-d to tlw Clerk of .s:iid ('_ .. ou:-t wiLl1 the prc•C:l·eding:> 1hcrc..:.ndcr cndor~·-d tJ.cn.:::;;:-_ 
IT IS FUHT!lEH 011DEHED, AD.JUDGED Al':D DECHF.ED BY THE C'OUI1T THAT at ;uch time as tl1c de-
fend.:mt h<·rein is r<·k.i~ed from confinf'nH•nt by tJ:c Dcp~irtmt'nt of Cvrn:ctions of tiie S1.1t,___. of Ohbh(!:na. he sh::li ('e 
n·lc.ris"d to Ill<! Sl)(•riff of ]'.-1yne u.unty to lx.: rd urned ~o tliis Courl !o (•ithcr PBY or vthl"r-..~ jS(~ liq'.iiC3IC tht ('{).j~ oi 
llijs 11ction, oil without prC'judJce Lo trusty or oLlicr prison re·.i.:;:irds. 
______ f:_~/ 4_&cu~-------~~T JUJGE 
101 
APPENDIX C 
VERDICT AND SENTENCING FORMS 
INn:t: DTSTRICT ______ COU~T o:: ;>,A,\'~~l: COUNIY, S7AT;: o;: c:~LA:-:oMA 
STATE QE OKI ~HO~!"-.- l 
Plaintifl'_ 
vs. 
___ N~EA~L GARNET~T,___________ f 
ne1-emi-ant.-- J 
VERDICT 
Case No. 7 5 - 4 1 2 0 7 
_WE, THE JURY, Emprndcd and sworn co cry chc issues in che above enritle<l cause, do upon 
our o;iths, fin<l that the defendant, Neal Garnett, is 
of Robbery by Force as set forth in the Information. 
Foreman 
IN n:r; __ _,D'-'T'-'S'-'T'--'R'--'I'--'C'-'T'--_____ COURT o:: PAYNl2 COUNTY, STATE or: c:(LA:-:OMA 
STATE OE OKLAHOMA 
va. Caso No. 7 5 - 4 1 2 0 7 
NEAL GARNETT 
VERDICT 
WE, THE JURY, Emp:indc<l and sworn co try the issues in the above cncitlc<l cause, do upon 
our oaths, find that the dcfcnclant, Neal Garnett, is Guilty of Robbery by Force 
as set forth in the Information, and we further fix ancl assess his 
punishment at imprisonment in the State Penetcntiary for a period of 
_Foreman 
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APPENDIX D 
SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL 
This page of instructions is included in your booklet 
in order to demonstrate to you the proper way to complete 
the rating scales which follow. 
If, for example, you were asked to rate "John Doe's" 
personality, using the following scale, you would mark the 
blank which best fits your opinion. 
Warm Cold 
Thus, if you felt that John was an extremely warm per-
son, you would mark the blank directly under the word "Warm." 
If you felt that he was a very cold, unfeeling person, you 
might mark the blank directly under the word "Cold." If you 
felt that he was between the two extremes, you would mark 
one of the blanks between the extremes--the blank which best 
reflects your opinion. The check mark in the third blank 
above, for instance, would indicate that John is a warm 
person, but he is not extremely ~· 
10) 
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How would you rate the defendant on the following dimensions? 
Please check the blank which best fits your opinion. 
Strong Weak 
Inactive Active 
Good Bad 
APPENDIX E 
EVIDENCE RECALL QUESTIONNAIRE 
Please indicate the correct answer to each item by placing 
the corresponding letter in the space to the left of the 
question. 
1. The name of the victim in this case was1 
a) Steve Mandell. 
b) Fred Burroughs. 
c) James Lawrence. 
d) Matthew Logan. 
2. The crime for which the defendant was being tried 
wass 
a) robbery by force. 
b) mail fraud. 
c) attempted murder. 
d) arson. 
3. How many rounds of beer did the defendant and the 
victim have while they were together? 
a) 6-7 
b) more than 7 
c) 1 
d) 4-5 
4. Where did the crime take place? 
a) in an alley 
b) in the victim's home 
c) outside a bar 
d) just up the street from the police station 
5. How much money was taken from the victim? 
a) $250 
b) no money was taken 
c) about $30 
d) $80 - $85 
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6. What was the defendant wearing when he was 
arrested? 
a) light blue pajamas 
b) the same clothes he had been wearing the 
night before 
c) bathing suit and scuba gear 
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d) there was no mention of what he was wearing 
7. How was the victim injured? 
a) beaten 
b) shot 
e) stabbed 
d) strangled 
8. According to the defendant, what did he do after 
the victim left him on the night of the crime? 
a) went to the restroom 
b) left with the victim 
c) stayed where he was for the rest of the 
night 
d) none of these 
9. Who was at home with the defendant when he was 
arrested? 
a) his wife 
b) his parents 
c) no one 
d) his girlfriend 
10. How was the victim able to identify Neal Garnett 
as his assailant? 
a) he assumed that he had been attacked by 
Neal Garnett 
b) he said he saw Neal Garnett's face just 
before being kicked in the head 
c) it was Neal Garnett who took him to the 
hospital 
d) all of the above 
APPENDIX F 
EVIDENCE IMPORTANCE QUESTIONNAIRE 
Below is a random listing of eight pieces of evidence 
presented in the trial you have been considering. Please 
indicate which of the items you feel is most important by 
placing a "l" ··in the space beside it. Then select the 
second most important item of evidence and place a "2 .. in 
the space next to it, and so on through all eight. You 
will, then, number these items from "l" (most important) 
to "8" (least important). 
Amount of alcohol consumed by the victim and 
defendant 
Physician's description of victim's injuries 
Amount of money found on defendant when he was 
arrested 
Testimony of the bartender from the B. & L. Club 
Claim by victim that he saw defendant's face just 
before being kicked in the head 
Defendant's lack of corroboration from the female 
bartender in the second bar he went to that night 
Absence of stains on defendant's Qlothes when 
arrested 
Defendant's account of his activities after the 
victim had left the bar 
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Item of 
Evidence 
Amount of Alco-
hol Consumed by 
Victim and 
Defendant 
Physician's 
Testimony 
Amount of 
Money Found on 
Defendant When 
Arrested 
Bartender's 
Testimony 
Victim's Claim 
of Seeing Def-
endant During 
Attack 
Defendant's 
Lack of 
Corroboration 
Absence of 
Stains on Def-
endant's Clothes 
Defendant's 
Account of Own 
Activities 
APPENDIX G 
EVIDENCE IMPORTANCE ITEMS 
Character 
of 
Evidence 
Varies 
Changed 
Across 
Tapes? 
Yes 
Ambiguous .:No 
Varies 
Varies 
Varies 
Damaging 
Non-
Damaging 
Non-
Damaging 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
108 
Source of Change 
Amount ranges from low 
in high guilt to high 
in low guilt condition 
Amount ranges from $70 
in high guilt to $7 in 
low guilt condition 
Certainty of testimony 
varies from high in 
high guilt to low in 
ambiguous; in low guilt 
condition, bartender 
testified for defense 
Certainty varies from 
high in high guilt to 
low in low guilt 
condition 
APPENDIX H 
ORIENTATION INFORMATION 
As a duly designated officer of this, the 9th Judicial 
District, which includes both Logan and Payne Counties, I. 
wish to thank you for fulfilling the summons which notified 
you to appear as a prospective juror. 
Jury service is both a privilege and a responsibility. 
Exceptions to jury duty are infrequent. They are given for 
the infirm, care of minor children, or other hardship cases. 
Do any of you wish at this time to petition this court for 
relief of duty as a juror? 
Since this criminal case does not involve the death 
penalty. juries of six members will be used. Three juries 
have been randomly formed, and alternates, who will serve in 
case of illness of a juror, are present. If no juror becomes 
ill, the alternates will remain in this room for further in-
structions after the juries have retired to deliberate. 
Shortly, both the Prosecutor for the State of Oklahoma, 
Mr. /Ms. and the Defense counsel, Mr. /Ms. 
will examine you to determine your fitness to serve as a 
fair and impartial juror in this criminal case. They will 
each ask you questions in turn during the voir dire. Voir 
dire is a Latin term which means "to speak the truth." 
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Before they begin the voir dire, I must ask you to rise and 
swear to this oath. 
(Administer Jurors' Oath) 
Now, before the attorneys begin their voir dire, I will 
ask each of you to state your name, residence, age, and 
occupation. 
(Allow Jurors to Give This Information) 
We have in the legal philosophy upon which our justice 
system is based, the presumption of innocence. This presump-
tion stays with the defendant throughout the trial until that 
point at which you are convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that he is- guilty. Do you have any quarrel with this 
philosophy? 
Do you believe that the burden of proof should be on the 
State to convince you, beyond reasonable doubt, that the 
defendant is guilty as charged in the indictment? 
If you had to vote right now, how would you vote? 
Do you promise not to make up your mind regarding guilt 
or innocence until you have heard al~ the evidence? Do you 
promise not to allow the personalities of either the Prosecu-
tor or the Defense Attorney influence your decision? Do you 
have any fixed opinion at this time regarding the guilt or 
innocence of the defendant, Mr. Neal Garnett? 
All right, now the Attorney for the State, Mr./Ms. 
will proceed with the voir dire. 
APPENDIX I 
QUESTIONS FOR VOIR DIRE 
To Be Asked by Prosecutors 
1. Have you ever served on a jury before? (How long ago?) 
2. Do you know the defendant in this case, Neal Garnett? 
3. Do you know the victim, James Lawrence? 
4. Do you have any relatives or close friends who are law 
enforcement officers? (What is the relationship, etc.?) 
5. Have you ever been the victim of a robbery? (How long 
ago?) 
To Be Asked by Defense Attorneys 
1. Do you know anyone who is an officer or employee of the 
court? (How well do you know them, etc.?) 
2. Do you know anyone who has been tried or convicted of a 
felony? (How long ago?) 
3. Have you ever been a witness in a criminal action? (When?) 
4. Is there any reason why you cannot give the evidence in 
this case a fair hearing? 
5. Is there any reason why you cannot give the State of 
Oklahoma and the Defendant a fair trial? 
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APPENDIX J 
FURTHER INFORMATION FOR JURORS 
For Jurors in One-Stage Proceedings 
Now that you have heard the evidence and the judge's 
instructions in this case, please go into the room we have 
designated for your deliberations. In the deliberation room, 
you will find individual ballot pads and pencils. Please use 
these forms for your individual voting. When you have 
reached a unanimous vereict, please record it on the verdict 
form provided. 
If you find the defendant not guilty, you will open the 
door to the deliberation room so that we will know you are 
finished. If you find the defendant guilty, you will then 
decide on his punishment. Please record this decision on 
the form provided for recommendation of punishment, which is 
the second sheet attached to the verdict form. Once this is 
done, you may open the door so that we will know that you are 
finished. Please do not throw away any materials you use 
during your deliberation. Are there any questions? 
For Jurors in Bifurcated Proceedings 
Now that you have heard the evidence and the judge's 
instruetions in this case, please go into the room we have 
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designated for your deliberations. You will deeide whether 
you believe the defendant to be guilty or innocent. 
In the deliberation room, you will find individual 
ballot pads and pencils. Please use these forms for your 
individual voting. When you have reached a unanimous ver-
diet, please record it on the verdict form provided and open 
the door so that we will know that you are finished, Please 
do not throw away any materials you use during your deliber-
ations. Are there any questions? 
(The following information is to be given to jurors 
in the bifurcated condition, if their verdict is 
"guilty. 11 ) 
Since your verdict in this case is guilty, please return 
to the courtroom; we have some additional information for you 
before you recommend punishment. 
(In the courtroom, play the segment of the videotape 
which concerns the prior record of the defendant, 
plus the additional judge's instructions.) 
Now that you have the additional information in this 
ease, please go back into deliberation and decide on punish-
ment. When you have made your decision, please record it on 
the form provided for recommendation of punishment and then 
open the door so we will know that your deliberations have 
ended. 
APPENDIX K 
GROUP RESULTS 
Group Number of Initial Level Type Verdict Sentence De lib, Delih. 
Males/Fem. Split of of (G/NG) Time Time 
in Groups G-NG Ev id, Trial · Verdict Sentence 
1 J/3 5-1 High One-Stage G 40 years lJ,4 min. 4. 2 lllin. 
2 3/3 J-J High One-Stage NG 111, 4 min. 
3 2/4 1-5 High One-Stage NG 29.0 min. 
4 2/4 4-2 High One-Stage G 5 years 32.0 min. 2. 0 min. 
5 2/4 J-3 High One-Stage NG 60.0 min. 
6 6/0 4-2 High One-Stage G 10 years 15.0 min. 2.3 min. 
7 2/4 2-4 High Bifurcated NG 8,J min. 
8 J/J 5-1 High Bifurcated G 15 years 4.1 min. 7.2 min. 
9 4/2 4-2 High Bifurcated G 10 years 57,2 min. 5, 5 min. 
10 1/5 J-J High Bifurcated NG 28,4 min. 
11 5/1 2..;4 High Bifurcated NG 14, 5 min. 
12 o/6 1-5 High Bifurcated NG 8.4 min. 
lJ 4/2 1-5 Am big. One-Stage NG 10.l nin. 
14 4/2 o-6 AmbiF>;. One-Stage NG 15.1 min. 
15 2/4 2-4 Am big. One-Stage G 5 years 43,J min. 1. 2 min. 
16 1/5 4-2 Am big. One-Stage G 5 years 52.4 min. 1.1 min, 
17 4/2 1-5 Am big, one-Stage NG 7,2 min. 
18 5/1 2-4 Am big, One-Stage NG ·36. 2 min. 
19 4/2 1-5 Am]lig, Bifurcated NG 7,1 111in. • 
20 J/J 1-5 Ambig, Bifurcated NG 2. 5 11in. 
21 2/4 2-4 Am big, Bifurcated NG 9, 5 min. 
22 1/5 0-6 Am big. Bifurcated NG 4.o min. 
2} 4/2 3-3 Ambig. Bifurcated NG 10.0 min, 
211 2/4 4-2 Am big. Bifurcated NG l?. J min. 
25 3/3 o-6 Low One-Stage NG l?.O 111in. 
26 1/5 2-4 Low One-Stage NG 14.1 min. 
2? 2/4 2-11 Low One-Stage NG 4.J min. 
28 5/1 1-5 Low One-Stage NG 25.2 Dl in. 
29 J/3 o-6 J,ow One-Strrp:e NG 2.1 min. 
JO 3/J 1-5 Low One-Stage NG 21. 2 min. 
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Croup Number of Initial Level Type Verdict Sentence De lib, Delib, 
Males/Fem. Split of of (G/NG) Time Tiru 
in Groupe G-NG Ev id. Trial Verdict Sentence 
Jl 211~ 1-5 Low Bi.furca ted NG 5.0 min. 
)2 2/4 o-6 Low Bifurcated NG 2.J rnin. 
J3 4/2 o-6 Low Bifurcated NG 12.l min. 
34 J/J o-6 Low Bifurcated liG 2.4 min. 
35 1/5 o-6 Low Bifurcated NG 4.0 min. 
J6 4/2 o-6 Low Bifurcated NG J.l min. 
Total Males 102 
Total Females 114 
Grand Total N "' 216 
APPENDIX L 
DATA FOR ALTERNATES 
Dependent Variables VERDICT 
Source D.F. Sum of F-Value PR) F 
Squares 
Models 
Level of Evidence 2 1.92 6.29 * Type of Trial l .12 .so NS 
Evidence X Type Trial 2 .79 2.59 NS 
Error 33 5.05 
* P. <. 004 
(Ms = .3, .?, and .9 for high to low guilt, respectively) 
Dependent Variable: POTENCY 
Source D. F. Sum of F-Value PR> F 
Squares 
Models 
Level of Evidence 2 4.35 • 56 NS 
Type of Trial 1 1).23 3.40 * Evidence X Type Trial 2 .oo oOO NS 
Error 33 128.61 
* P. <. 07 
(Ms= 4.7 and 6.o for one-stage and bifur., respectively) 
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Dependent Variable1 AMOUNT OF MONEY ON DEFENDANT 
Source D.F. Sum of F-Value PR )F 
Squares 
Models 
Level of Evidence 2 8.74 1.25 NS 
Type of Trial 1 2.29 .66 NS 
Evidence X Type Trial 2 21.44 3.07 * 
Error 33 115.21 
* ll < . 06 
(Ms for one-stage= 2.7, 7.0, and J.4 in high to low 
guilt, respectively; Ms for bifurcated= 4.2, 4.9, and 
1.6 in high to low guilt, respectively) 
Dependent Variables BARTENDER'S TESTIMONY 
Source D.F. 
Models 
Level of Evidence 2 
Type of Trial 1 
Evidence X Type Trial 2 
Error 33 
* E. <. 005 
Sum of F-Value PR.> F 
Squares 
54.77 6.15 * i.33 • 30 NS 
. 26. 57 2.98 ** 
147.01 
(Ms = 3.7, 5.3, and 2.5 for high to low guilt, respectively) 
** ll <. 06 
(M_s for one-stage = 2.7, 7.0, and J.4 for high to low guilt, 
respectively; Ms for bifurcated = 4.2, 4.9, and 1.6 for 
high to low guilt, respectively) 
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Dependent Variablet CLAIM BY VICTIM 
Souree D.F. Sum of F-Value PR) F 
Squares 
Models 
Level of Evidence 2 21.69 3.08 * Type of Trial 1 1.71 .49 NS 
Evidence X Type Trial 2 9.03 1.28 NS 
Error 33 116.32 
* 12 < • 06 
(Ms = 2.3, 2.4, and 3.8 for high to low guilt, respectively) 
Dependent Variables DEFENDANT'S LACK OF CORROBORATION 
Source D. F. Sum of F-Value PR> F 
Squares 
Models 
Level of Evidence 2 12.14 2.24 
Type of Trial 1 1.07 .39 
Evidence X Type Trial 2 20.75 3.82 
Error 33 89.61 
* Jl( .OJ 
(Ms for one-stage= 5.0, 4.0, and 7.1 for high to low 
guilt, respectively: Ms for bifurcated = 7.7, 5.9, and 
6.5 for high to low guilt, respectively) 
NS 
NS 
* 
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Dependent Variables DEFENDANT'S ACCOUNT OF OWN ACTIVITIES 
Source D.F. Sum of F-Value PR) F 
Squares 
Models 
Level of Evidence 2 3.51 .41 
Type of Trial 1 ?.26 1.68 
Evidenee X Type Trial 2 27.58 3.20 
Error 33 142.40 
* E < . 05 
(Ms for one-stage = 5.3, 1.0, and 5.0 for high to low 
guilt, respectively; Ms for bifurcated = 3.3, 4.o, and 
3.4 for high to low guilt, respectively) 
NS 
NS 
* 
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